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Communities throughout the United States are susceptible to hazardous materials 
releases, with varying impact. Unfortunately, some of those incidents have caused 
catastrophic casualties, irreversible environmental damage, revenue loss, and 
nonconventional impacts such as community and industry social implications—many of 
which could have been prevented. This thesis creates a framework to help communities 
better prepare for chemical emergencies. The research examined two case studies, 
revealing three major disconnects and several challenges that emergency management 
professionals face to pursue a delicate balance of natural resources, population growth, 
limited resources, security, and the need for commercial goods—made possible by the 
necessary use and manufacturing of chemicals. This framework enables communities 
throughout the United States to better prepare for chemical disasters. It offers first 
responders, emergency management professionals, the private sector, and community 
members a collaborative path toward making their communities more resilient to 
chemical disasters in order to diminish preventable hazards and lessen inevitable impacts. 
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Risk, in the context of homeland security, combines likelihood and consequences 
associated with a hazard. Though it might not be possible to reduce every hazard, once 
one is identified, appropriate safeguards can be implemented and the risk from the hazard 
can be reduced. Once a hazard is identified, decisions must be made concerning tolerable 
and acceptable risk. This requires high-quality hazard evaluations. An incorrect 
perception of risk at any point could lead to either inefficient use of limited resources or 
unknowingly accepted risks that may exceed the true tolerance of a community.  
Most communities are vulnerable to hazardous materials emergencies, whether 
through unintentional or deliberate acts. Some emergencies are small and infrequent, but 
too many have catastrophic and deadly outcomes. Because communities lack awareness 
about their vulnerabilities, prevention and preparedness are often left inadequately 
addressed. The methodology presented in this thesis evaluates two case studies from 
recent hazardous materials incidents to connect and identify key root causes that led to 
these events and their consequences. The research then evaluates current regulatory 
frameworks and established reporting requirements to determine how they can help 
improve the safety of communities with high-risk chemical facilities in their jurisdictions.   
The methodology reveals three common failures and their underlying root causes 
that led to the catastrophic disaster. Communities must assess their risks related to 
chemical releases whether they are related to a facility or transportation. Risk 
assessments can identify those risks and vulnerabilities to help better plan and prepare for 
those emergencies. Regulatory risk management must be effective and the research 
identified significant gaps in the current regulatory framework. Lastly, communities must 
communicate and have open transparency at all levels. First responders, emergency 
management professionals, industry, regulatory agencies at all levels, and the public need 
to effectively work together to safeguard communities against incidents like those 
presented in this thesis that could have been otherwise preventable. Ultimately, this thesis 
recommends that communities use a framework built upon risk assessment to evaluate 
chemical hazards. The study suggests ways to enhance data collection and sharing to 
 xvi 
improve prevention, response, and mitigation. Through effective coordination, 
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“Risk” is no longer “chance or probability of loss,” but “the effect of 
uncertainty on objectives.” 
—International Organization for Standardization 
In 1984, a catastrophic hazardous materials incident occurred in Bhopal, India, at 
the Union Carbide pesticide manufacturing facility, forever changing the history of 
chemical safety at industrial facilities around the world. The Union Carbide facility 
mistakenly released methyl-isocyanate, a highly toxic industrial chemical, killing 
thousands and causing permanent, disabling injuries to hundreds of thousands more 
sleeping through the night, coupled with extensive property and environmental damage.1 
The Bhopal incident is considered one of the worst industrial catastrophes of its kind, and 
prompted legislative proposals designed to reduce the risk of chemical accidents. 
Tens of thousands of high-risk chemical facilities are scattered across the United 
States and are located within close proximity to communities with sensitive receptors 
such as homes, schools, hospitals, and other critical infrastructures. The Bhopal incident 
prompted many in the United States to question our own chemical facilities’ safety 
practices and their potential hazard to our communities and resources, as well as the 
global economy.  
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF CHEMICALS ON A GLOBAL LEVEL 
The manufacturing and use of hazardous materials is a vital element to the U.S. 
economy and is a key component to the critical infrastructure sector. A quick snapshot 
from the American Chemical Council reveals the chemical sector contributes over 
800,000 jobs to the American economy.2 Additionally, “chemical manufacturing is one 
of America’s top exporting industries, with $191 billion in exports in 2014,” which 
                                                 
1 Jackson B. Browing, Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal (Houston, TX: Union Carbide, 1993). 
2 “Jobs and Wages,” American Chemical Council, accessed June 6, 2015, 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/jobs-and-wages.  
 2 
accounts for nearly 14% of all U.S. exports.3 Growth in the U.S. gross domestic product 
(GDP) at the end of 2013 signaled the chemical industry’s returning importance to the 
world economy.4 Despite the global economy’s recent slowdown, the hazardous 
materials business is vital to many products that are used in our everyday lives, from 
basic life necessities to simple conveniences. The American Chemistry Council’s 
Economics & Statistics division projects that the U.S. chemical industry’s revenue will 
reach $1 trillion in sales by the year 2019.5 
Supporting U.S. GDP growth, hazardous materials form a vital link in job 
creation and in the return of a strong domestic manufacturing sector.6 For example, for 
every “one chemical industry job, 6.3 other jobs are generated in other sectors of the 
economy, including construction, transportation, and agriculture.”7 This amounts to 
nearly six million hazardous materials-dependent jobs.8 Not only does the chemical 
industry support employment in the United States, it also strengthens its export base, 
making it doubly attractive for sabotage. Key critical operations and infrastructures rely 
on the chemical industry to function, but the economic benefits must not outweigh the 
safety and risk that these facilities impose on communities and the environment. Industry 
must have safeguards in place to prevent harm. The role of the emergency management 
professional is to coordinate and implement that plan, in concert with local emergency 
responders, to minimize the consequences of any potential chemical release.  
Smaller hazardous materials incidents occur all too frequently, but catastrophic 
incidents such as Bhopal are unusual. Even so, the potential for disaster is ever present 
due to the increasing demand for consumer products that require hazardous chemicals in 
some stage of manufacturing. The National Response Center (NRC) maintains a database 
                                                 
3 American Chemistry Council, Year-End 2013 Chemical Industry Situation and Outlook: American 
Chemistry Is Back in the Game (Washington, DC: American Chemistry Council, December 2013). 
4 Ibid. 
5 American Chemistry Council, Year-End 2014 Chemical Industry Situation and Outlook: American 
Chemistry Builds Momentum (Washington, DC: American Chemistry Council, December 2014). 
6 Ibid. 
7 American Chemistry Council, Year-End 2013. 
8 Ibid. 
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for reporting all spills and accidents related to hazardous materials, as well as 
coordinating large-scale incident response. Response is managed through national 
communications centers, staffed and operated by United States Coast Guard officers and 
maritime scientists.9 The database that captures the information is called the Emergency 
Response Notification System (ERNS). Although the database is extensive, only 
chemical releases over the federal reporting threshold are required, by law, to be reported 
to the system. Some states have their own reportable thresholds that are lower than the 
federal reporting thresholds. Once recorded in the system, reports to the NRC are then 
assigned to a regional coordinator for follow-up and/or response activation. The Right-to-
Know Network, an organization operated by the Center for Effective Government, 
provides a number of environmental databases collected from various sources, including 
the ERNS.10 In 2014 alone, a total of 21,632 incidents were reported to the NRC as 
collected by the ERNS. Of that, a staggering number of deaths—835—were reported, 
along with 1,321 injuries, amounting to $50,012,848 in property damage.11 Appendix A 
provides a summary of the types of hazardous materials incidents related to facilities, 
transportation, and others for 2014. 
Few people know that hazardous materials are used in the manufacture of many 
everyday products, including, but not limited to, plastics, fuel for our vehicles, soaps, 
cosmetics, agricultural products, solar panel production, components used in wind farms, 
and pharmaceuticals. From processes used to make water safe to drink, to the electricity 
we consume continuously, hazardous materials are used and manufactured into our daily 
necessities, which makes them too vital to eliminate. Chemicals are stored in every 
community at industrial businesses, chemical manufacturing plants, grocery stores, 
schools, transportation yards, farms, refineries, gas stations, swimming pools, water 
treatment facilities, and the like. Large quantities of hazardous materials pass through 
communities through different modes of transportation, including trucks, trains, ships, 
                                                 
9 “Welcome to the National Response Center,” National Response Center, accessed October 25, 2015, 
http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/. 
10 “The Right-to-Know Network,” accessed October 25, 2015, http://www.rtknet.org/.  
11 “ERNS Database Advanced Search,” The Right-to-Know Network, accessed October 25, 2015, 
http://www.rtknet.org/db/erns/search. 
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and pipelines. That is without mentioning the un-predictable forces of Mother Nature, 
including the destructive forces of earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, and fires. Human error, 
mechanical failure, and acts of terrorism and sabotage add to the many contending factors 
of risk management, safety, and security at high-risk chemical facilities.  
In the last several years, an alarming number of significant hazardous materials 
incidents have raised concerns related to the regulatory oversight and operations of these 
high-risk chemical facilities.12 Although facilities that manufacture and store hazardous 
materials present a danger, it is a risk that most accept, almost unknowingly. But it is a 
risk that must be, and can be, managed responsibly. 
B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Disruptions to a chemical process at a high-risk chemical facility result in a 
multitude of risks. These disruptions may be a result of natural disasters, mechanical 
failures, human errors, or sabotage, and consequences may include significant social and 
economic disruptions not only for the business, but also at the local, state, and regional 
levels.  
Emergency management, as defined by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), consists of the “organized analysis, planning, decision making, and 
assignment of available resources to mitigate (lessen the effect of or prevent), prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from the effects of all hazards. The goal of emergency 
management is to save lives, prevent injuries, and protect property and the environment if 
an emergency occurs.”13 Emergency management encompasses the coordination of all 
emergency functions and services including fire, law enforcement, medical, and health 
within—and perhaps beyond—a community. 
                                                 
12 “CSX Corp Train Derailment in Mount Carbon, West Virginia: Crude by Rail Train Derailment 
Resulted in a Huge Fireball, Destroyed Home, Forced Evacuations and Closed Downstream Public Water 
Supply, Globe and Mail, February 16, 2015,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/; Manny Fernandez, “Lax 
Oversight Cited as Factor in Deadly Blast at Texas Plant,” New York Times, April 22, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/; “47 Dead in Lac-Megantic Crude by Rail Train Derailment, Globe and Mail, 
July 6, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/; “Chevron Refinery Fire,” CSB, accessed October 15, 
2015, http://www.csb.gov/chevron-refinery-fire/; “Tesoro Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire,” CSB, 
accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.csb.gov/tesoro-refinery-fatal-explosion-and-fire/.  
13 FEMA, Introduction to Emergency Management Course (Washington, DC: FEMA, 1995), 1–6. 
 5 
A community consists of individuals who reside in specific locations and share a 
common geographic locality.14 Within that common location, communities more 
specifically comprise networks of people that include stakeholders, foundations, 
government and non-government organizations involved in community development, 
housing and economic development, and community, organizational, and business 
development.15 The role and impact of an emergency management professional, who 
bridges communication between industry and regulated agencies, is crucial to a 
community. Many communities have community emergency response team (CERT) 
programs that share interests in educating and assisting in disasters and preparedness.16 
An active and involved CERT plays an integral element in the community. The 
regulatory agencies within a community involve the local offices of emergency services; 
building, planning, and land use; and environmental health departments, which ensure 
compliance with codes, mandates, laws, and regulations.17 Industries bring economic 
support, jobs, consumer benefits, and tax revenue to the community. Without commercial 
businesses, a community falls behind in economic growth and development. Every 
individual and organization within the community plays a vital role in ensuring the health 
                                                 
14 Mirriam-Webster, s.v. “Community,” accessed October 24, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/community. 
15 Dictionary.com, s.v. “Community,” accessed December 16, 2015, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/community. 
16 “Community Emergency Response Teams,” FEMA, last modified January 5, 2016, 
http://www.fema.gov/community-emergency-response-teams.  
17 “Environmental Health departments have the capability to protect the public from environmental 
hazards and manages the health effects of an environmental health emergency on the public. Their 
capability minimizes human exposures to environmental public health hazards (e.g., contaminated food, air, 
water, solid wastes/debris, hazardous materials, wastes, vegetation, sediments and vectors). Their capability 
provides the expertise to run fate and transport models; design, implement, and interpret the results of 
environmental field surveys and laboratory sample analyses; develop protective guidance where none 
exists; and use available data and judgment to recommend appropriate actions for protecting the public and 
environment. Environmental Health identifies environmental hazards in the affected area through rapid 
needs assessments and comprehensive environmental health and risk assessments. It works closely with the 
health community and environmental agencies to link exposures with predicted diseases outcomes, 
provides input in the development of Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication messages, provides 
guidance on personal protective measures, and advises on environmental health guidelines.” Department of 
Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, September 2007), 309, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 
government/training/tcl.pdf. 
 6 
and success of that community. A community that has developed a cohesive partnership 
among all stakeholders has increased resiliency. 
Events such as catastrophic hazardous materials releases within a community can 
result in physical damage to properties, infrastructure, and facilities, but can also affect 
business through indirect economic losses. Social impacts to a community can extend 
from distrust and anger toward the responsible business, governing agencies, and the 
industry in general. These social impacts can cause significant overall problems within a 
community; the physical aspects of loss and emotional damage as a result of fatalities, 
injuries, and illnesses can also cause social consequences. A well-prepared community 
must have the capacity to understand, manage, prevent, and be resilient to impacts of 
hazardous release. Though larger metropolitan cities often have the resources and 
evacuation strategies for large-scale chemical disasters, smaller communities with fewer 
resources and capabilities often rely on the state or nearby mutual aid for assistance.  
The need to prepare and pre-plan for chemical emergencies starts with 
understanding risks. Smaller communities are often unaware of regulatory requirements 
and mandates for storing chemicals.18 Homeland security professionals, emergency 
management professionals, regulatory agencies, and industries must work together as a 
community to collaboratively identify the chemical sector’s vulnerabilities and the 
impacts and challenges they present. Hazardous materials incident investigations 
routinely find that communities are not working together. A disconnect exists between 
emergency management, regulatory agencies, and commercial industries when it comes 
to working effectively together as a community to recognize, plan, and prepare for 
chemical disasters.  
Though it is foolish to imagine that chemical emergencies can be one hundred 
percent preventable, they still occur too frequently throughout our communities. Certain 
measures, however, can be taken to lower the risks and impacts from a catastrophic 
chemical disaster. Since communities of all sizes house hazardous chemicals, they must 
all be able to adequately assess and identify the likelihood of risks and potential impacts, 
                                                 
18 “West Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion and Fire,” CSB, accessed October 15, 2015, 
http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.  
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and evaluate potential hazards’ severities. Unfortunately, many communities have not 
prepared nor planned for such impacts. Preparedness and mitigation plans must be in 
place for response and recovery. According to Chair of the Jefferson County Local 
Emergency Planning Committee Timothy Gablehouse, communities unaware of their 
risks are not capable of responding to a chemical disaster.19 In March, 1999, Gablehouse 
was responding to a chemical plant disaster that killed four employees in Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, when he stated:  
The tragic accident in Allentown, Pennsylvania is an example of the 
numerous chemical accidents that occur every year in this country…the 
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board (now 
CSB) indicates that some 256 people are killed per year in chemical 
accidents. They observe that these accidents have impacts well beyond 
those killed as “Workers, companies, the public, emergency response 
organizations, and all levels of government pay the figurative and literal 
price.” It is precisely this sense of community impact that is important to 
the understanding of why chemical risk and accident scenario information 
in the hands of the public and response agencies is so critical…. 
Better planning and response begins with better information. Facilities 
depend upon public response agencies to protect them or at least to 
support internal response efforts. Accordingly, information about 
chemicals and risks must be in the hands of these agencies if they are to be 
effective and protect the lives of their personnel. Equally important, 
however, is the idea that the general public has a role in the prevention and 
planning for accidents. This role is found in community decisions such as 
planning and zoning, funding the equipment a fire department should 
purchase, and the steps members of the public should take in the event of 
an accident… 
It is notoriously difficult to predict the impact of changed procedures and 
information in 20/20 hindsight. Nonetheless, there are several things of 
which I am certain: 
1. No community can be prepared to respond to a chemical accident 
unless it fully understands the chemicals present in that 
community, the risk of accidents these chemicals present and the 
accident impact scenarios they may face. 
                                                 
19 Joint Hearing before the Subcommittees on Health and Environment and Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives. Internet Posting of Chemical 
“Worst Case” Scenarios: A Roadmap for Terrorists. February 10, 1999, Serial No. 106–3. 107–109. 
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2. No community can take accident prevention and mitigation steps 
such as zoning to keep dangerous facilities away from vulnerable 
areas such as schools and hospitals unless they have this same 
information.  
3. No facility can prevent accidents unless it understands how 
accidents can happen and the risks they face from the chemicals in 
their facility. 
4. No facility can properly plan to respond to a chemical accident 
without understanding the accident scenarios they face. 
5. No facility is an island—their accidents do have an impact beyond 
the fence line. Chemical accidents kill and injure people that live in 
these communities. Chemical accidents can devastate local 
economies. Chemical accidents can damage or destroy critical 
community services.  
6. The prevention and mitigation of chemical accidents is a 
community-wide problem. Without adequate information on 
chemical risk and accident scenarios the community cannot 
participate.20 
Prevention is key, but when a hazardous materials incident occurs that negatively 
impacts a community, society pushes back, affecting the entire community. The incident 
also affects the responsible industry in ways for which they may not have been prepared 
both from public and political outrage, which results in social animosity and negative 
public perception. Understanding and managing risk effectively can help everyone be 
prepared. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Effective risk management and communication for a wide range of risks requires 
a concerted approach to the management of emergency preparedness. Although federal, 
state, regional, and local area hazardous materials response plans offer a framework for 
how to respond to an incident, they do not address how to prevent and evaluate the risks 
of chemical disasters.21 An effective and resilient community must have in place 
                                                 
20 Joint Hearing before the Subcommittees on Health and Environment and Oversight and 
Investigations. 
21 Public Health and Welfare (U.S.C. Title 42), Ch. 116, Sec. 11003. 
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partnerships with local governments, organizations, citizens, and industries to enhance 
hazardous materials preparedness and lessen their impacts. Without these partnerships, 
communities will continue to be vulnerable to the next potential hazardous materials 
disasters. Further, communities must identify and address failures in communication, 
regulatory inconsistencies, and the ability to recognize hazards and risks from chemical 
facilities. A community that understands these issues and their risks can then develop and 
implement a framework at the community level that incorporates hazard mitigation, 
preparedness, and response recovery for chemical disasters. In support of this community 
preparedness goal, this thesis asks: 
How can emergency management, regulatory agencies, and industries 
work together as a community to better prepare for chemical 
emergencies? 
A community’s ability to understand risk management and employ effective 
mechanisms to mitigate, communicate, and manage potential hazards can greatly 
decrease the occurrences and impacts of hazardous materials releases. This process must 
be managed by and have the participation of the entire community. The key to any risk 
management objective is for the community to be able to identify risks and effectively 
communicate those risks to the public and stakeholders, who can then prepare as 
necessary.22  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework and model that can be used 
by communities—and especially by emergency management professionals—to 
effectively assess and identify vulnerabilities related to chemical hazards from high-risk 
chemical facilities. The goal is to use common failures from case studies to determine 
how to effectively approach and mitigate the root causes of those failures. For the 
framework to effectively coordinate preparedness and response, the community must 
have cohesive communication, effective regulations, and an understanding of existing 
risks. Emergency management professionals, from both industry and regulatory areas, 
                                                 
22 Steven Maher, Practical Guide to Risk Management Communications (Mission Viejo, CA: Risk 
Management Professionals, 1999), 3–1. 
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generally agree that an effective risk communication plan must address general 
objectives. Some of these objectives include:  
• A system that notifies the community of a hazard 
• A plan for shelter-in-place and evacuation 
• Cooperation from the community to respond quickly at the request of first 
responders 
• Communication with the community about risk-related issues 
• Community understanding and preparedness as it relates to emergency 
preparation activities 
These elements help reduce impact in the event of a hazardous materials emergency.23  
The importance of high-risk chemical facilities and their processes has prompted 
safety regulations such as the risk management plans.24 Providing regulatory risk 
management to the community is critical, but there are inconsistent regulations and tools 
needed to effectively enforce those rules. In an attempt to resolve this problem, this thesis 
evaluates solutions and amendments to existing regulatory frameworks for risk 
assessment. The research focuses on how to strengthen and update regulations to ensure 
that facilities are held to a higher and safer operating standard.  
Communities as a whole must become more transparent. Existing state and local 
frameworks must communicate effectively about chemical inventories and their hazards 
to enhance the safety of the community and first responders. To respond effectively to 
these challenges, an emergency management preparedness plan must include the 
development of an emergency preparedness program. Time after time, incident 
investigations related to chemical disasters indicate that the devastating effects could 
have, in fact, been prevented. If these disasters are preventable, then why do they still 
occur?  
                                                 
23 Maher, Practical Guide, 1–2 
24 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 106–40 
(1999). 
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This thesis critically evaluates the current failures to get to the root of their 
causes, using them as lessons learned to create a more resilient community against 
chemical disasters. This information can then be used to help local governments and 
communities create a better framework for identifying vulnerabilities and risks, and 
guidelines for how to effectively lower risks by working together. The objective of this 
work is to provide guidance to emergency management professionals, regulatory 
agencies, and industry about how to work together to adequately assess, prepare, 
coordinate, and allocate resources in the event of chemical disaster within a community. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature relating to chemical facility preparedness and risk analysis studies 
commonly comes from governmental agencies, industry, and technical trade associations. 
Industry and trade associations, however, focus on best and accepted practices, as well as 
guidelines on safety measures. Since 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has been evaluating the nation’s vulnerabilities and risks related to the safety and security 
of chemical facilities, generating heightened alert and concern around the ease of access 
to these facilities and the handling of hazardous materials. The impact from sabotage or 
an intentional chemical release caused by terrorist activities would cause significant loss, 
as well as fear. A thorough review of the literature that identifies the importance of 
protecting our critical chemical infrastructure revealed serious gaps and questioned our 
emergency management professionals’ ability to identify the vulnerabilities by ensuring 
risk reduction associated with chemical facilities. 
Though catastrophic hazardous materials releases are not common, our 
communities are, nonetheless, in close proximity to facilities that house hazardous 
chemicals. As such, the emergency response community may well have to deal with 
hazardous materials releases, regardless of whether they arise from a terrorist attack, 
accidental release, or natural disaster. Furthermore, the fact that hazardous release is not 
common may create a complacency that cripples both preparedness and response. Since 
the chemical sector plays such a vital role in our economy, security, and lifestyle, it will 
always be in close proximity to population centers. It is not only an important element 
within our nation’s infrastructure, but an attractive potential target to cause harm and 
economic instability. Since terrorist activities directed at critical infrastructures handling 
hazardous materials have not yet been the cause of a catastrophic incident, this thesis 
focuses on non-deliberate threats arising from natural disasters, human error, and 
mechanical failures. Whatever the cause, the consequences of hazardous materials release 
are potentially catastrophic, and the safeguards developed to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from such releases will have far-reaching benefits. 
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A. CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED IMPLEMENTATIONS 
Shortly after the Union Carbide incident in Bhopal, India, the United States 
Congress created the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA).25 EPCRA established various monitoring and reporting systems to improve 
safety protocols, including establishing the Toxic Release Inventory. According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), this inventory requires chemical production 
facilities to report storage of certain hazardous materials in quantities equal to or greater 
than 25,000 pounds; any facility handling more than 10,000 pounds of listed chemical 
must also report their inventory.26 Under EPCRA, states are required to create State 
Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) and communities are to form Local 
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). Programs like these are established to help 
local emergency responders and stakeholders prepare for chemical emergencies. EPCRA 
requires facilities that store hazardous materials to provide necessary emergency response 
information, including chemical inventory and contacts to the LEPCs and the local fire 
departments on an annual basis.27 Although EPCRA’s objective is to focus on 
community emergency planning, it does not contain provisions to prevent chemical 
accidents or releases. The LEPCs are required to develop and implement regional plans 
for hazardous materials emergency response for the community. It is also the mission of 
the LEPC to ensure that the community is aware of the chemical risks and is prepared to 
act should a chemical release occur.  
In 1990, a few years after the creation of EPCRA, amendments were made to the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) to include a Risk Management Program (RMP) under Section 
112(r), which was to be implemented by the EPA’s Office of Emergency Management.28 
The CAA required the EPA to regulate and conduct inspections at facilities in order to 
lower the risk of a release that would impact the environment and the public.29 
                                                 
25 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–499, Title III. 
26 “Local Emergency Planning Committees,” EPA, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.epa.gov/ 
epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees. 
27 “Local Emergency Planning Committees,” EPA. 
28 Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR § 68, Sec. 112(r)(7). 
29 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Title III, Sec. 304, 301 (1990).  
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Additionally, the CAA required federal regulatory programs to focus on prevention 
programs to reduce chemical accidents and ensure the safety of the employees, 
communities, and environment. As implemented, the RMP was to identify a process for 
placing regulated substances, at or above a specific threshold quantity, into “risk 
categories based on: potential for offsite consequences associated with a worst case 
scenario calculation; accident history; and compliance with the prevention requirements 
under Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety 
Management Standard (PSM).”30 The PSM program calls for the institution to develop 
and implement chemical prevention and emergency response programs to protect workers 
at facilities that utilize and store hazardous materials.31 PSM is essentially a 
comprehensive, ongoing management system tasked with preventing major chemical 
releases and mitigating their consequences throughout the process life cycle. The 
emphasis on management systems, with an approach that integrates technologies, 
procedures, and management practices, serves to achieve safe operations while creating 
an effective safety culture.  
In addition, the CAA required the EPA to designate and list a minimum threshold 
of toxic and/or flammable substances with identified toxic end points—distances 
determined by predictive modeling of a chemical release scenario.32 Plume or air 
dispersion models are used to identify hazard zones based upon exposure to a toxic vapor 
cloud from a given hazardous material that would lead to severe health effects or death.33 
Facilities that meet the thresholds quantities are regulated under the RMP rule. A plume 
model indicating the toxic end point is required to be conducted by the facility to 
determine the relative offsite consequence of impact to the community. Further 
amendments to the CAA were established to help prevent chemical accidents. Both the 
PSM standards and the RMP programs mirror the CAA and EPCRA objectives, but the 
                                                 
30 Occupational Safety and Health Administration Process Safety Management Standard, 29 CFR § 
1910. 
31 29 CFR § 1910. 
32 40 CFR § 68, appendix A. 
33 Environmental Health Center, Evaluating Chemical Hazards in the Community: Using an RMP’s 
Offsite Consequence Analysis (EPA 550-B-99-015) (Washington, DC: EPA, May 1999), 6. 
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PSM program is focused exclusively on accident prevention and emergency response 
requirements at the facility.  
The RMP program’s focus is to regulate facilities’ prevention and response 
processes as a whole to lessen consequences to the public and environment. One major 
component of the RMP program is to identify risks through a hazard assessment. A 
hazard assessment is a tool in which risks and vulnerabilities are analyzed and defined. 
An analysis of the offsite consequences associated with worst-case and alternative release 
scenarios is conducted with a facility’s flammable and/or toxic substances.34 Through 
that assessment, safety measures are created, and a prevention and safety management 
program is put in place to implement those measures. In addition, certain chemical 
facilities must submit a five-year accident history report. The prevention program is 
essentially a multi-layered comprehensive management system for process safety. This 
study particularly relies on the chemical processes, including potential incident failures 
described, in the hazard analysis.  
High-risk chemical facilities are required by OSHA and EPA to have similar risk 
management functions, such as detailed written operating procedures, employee training, 
ongoing mechanical integrity of process equipment, incident investigation, emergency 
planning, analysis and control of process hazards, compliance audits, and the 
identification of safety systems.35 But these measures are not without gaps and 
inconsistencies. A significant difference between the two risk management programs is 
that the RMP program (EPA) assesses the risk posed on the community should a release 
occur, while the PSM program (OSHA) focuses on risk posed to the employees within 
the facility’s fence line from a release. This is analyzed by conducting an offsite 
consequence analysis (OCA).36 An OCA is an analytical plume model estimate utilizing 
worst-case or alternative-case release scenarios of the toxic or flammable material in a 
calculated release to indicate the potential impact the release would have on the public 
                                                 
34 40 CFR § 68, 112(r)(7). 
35 Spellman, Frank. A Guide to Compliance for Process Safety Management/Risk Management 
Planning (PSM/RMP). Technomic Publishing AG, Pennsylvania, 1997. (156) 
36 Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPP), Risk Management Program 
Guidance for Offsite Consequence Analysis (EPA 550-B-99-009) (Washington, DC: EPA, March 2009).  
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and environmental receptors outside the facility’s parameters.37 The EPA defines the 
worst-case scenario as “the release of the largest quantity of a regulated substance from a 
single vessel or process line failure that results in the greatest distance to an endpoint.”38 
Plume modeling incorporates information gathered regarding the chemical properties and 
conditions to estimate a scenario distance to endpoint. Because it is hard to predict 
weather conditions, the predictive plume is outlined as a circle, with the center being the 
facility and location of chemical release, while the radius is the distance to the end point 
of the potential impact and hazard zone. An OCA plume model will identify individual 
facility’s impact on the community. The vulnerabilities related to population and public 
receptors within the hazard zone.39 Figure 1 provides an example of a toxic worst-case 
scenario map given a toxic release.   
Figure 1.  Toxic Worst-Case Scenario Map 
 
Chemical facility with a calculated scenario with distance to end point for both worst- 
and alternative-case scenarios. The hazard zone is depicted in a circle due to unknown 
wind conditions. Source: CEPP, Risk Management Program Guidance for Offsite 
Consequence Analysis (EPA 550-B-99-009) (Washington, DC: EPA, March 2009), 5. 
                                                 
37 CEPP, Risk Management Program Guidance.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid. 
 18 
A “public receptor” includes “offsite residences, institutions [such as] schools, 
hospitals, industrial, commercial and office buildings, parks, or recreational areas 
inhabited or occupied at any time,” but not those “where members of the public could be 
exposed to radiant heat or overpressure as a result of an accidental release.”40  
By character, the worst-case OCA scenario shows a hypothetical maximum 
impact and is most often considered unlikely under most conditions.41 The objective of 
the worst-case OCA is to create awareness about potential hazards and is a way to 
identify risk-reduction strategies through effective emergency response, preparedness, 
risk communication, and accident prevention. Subsequently, the alternative-case scenario 
generally is considered to be more realistic or likely to occur. Surprisingly, however, 
there is no guideline or standardized approach for developing alternative scenarios. As a 
consequence, the results of this analysis vary widely and cause confusion among its 
administrators. By identifying receptors, the emergency management professional can 
prepare response plans and be able to effectively allocate resources. This, in essence, 
helps establish communication regarding preparedness with members of the community, 
industry, first responders, and government. The OCA scenarios, if applied consistently, 
provide valuable information for risk assessments and preparedness planning.  
The RMP worst-case scenario is the standard in which EPA identifies certain 
criteria. Most often used is the RMP*Comp web-based program, developed by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the EPA to help 
facilities calculate and assess their offsite consequence analysis.42 The worst-case 
scenario is based on the catastrophic release of the single largest vessel storing the toxic 
or flammable material. Dispersion of the material is dependent on several factors and 
parameters provided to the plume modeling program, including the surrounding terrain of 
the region, temperature of the material stored, and mitigation measures such as buildings 
or containment areas. The calculated hazard radius of the plume dispersion is determined 
                                                 
40 40 CFR 68 Sec. 3. 
41 A theory coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb to explain hard-to-predict and rare events that are 
beyond the realm of normal expectations in history, science, finance, and technology. Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (London: Penguin, 2007). 
42 “RMP*Comp,” EPA, accessed May 10, 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/rmpcomp. 
 19 
by the material’s toxicity, vapor density, potential heat, and blast radius of an explosion 
from the vessel that causes irreversible or life-threatening injuries—or death—to those 
impacted should the chemical be entirely released from its largest stored vessel.43 The 
RMP*Comp does not take into consideration wind direction, temperature, or time of the 
release. Therefore, the radius provided as the distance to toxic end point is merely an 
estimated circumference around the facility instead of a cone- or wedge-shaped plume 
should wind and area temperature be factored into the calculations.  
Additional plume modeling software is available, such as CAMEO.44 CAMEO is 
a software suite, also developed by NOAA and the EPA, normally used by hazardous 
materials emergency responders. CAMEO is also used by industry to submit chemical 
reporting for EPCRA. The system allows for a management of chemical inventory by 
facilities. Within the CAMEO software suite are Areal Locations of Hazardous 
Atmospheres (ALOHA) and Mapping Applications for Response, Planning, and Local 
Operational Tasks (MARPLOT), which help users identify potential impacts from 
chemical hazards. These are additional tools that the emergency management 
professional should utilize to create a map and framework. For the sake of creating a 
simple framework for this thesis, however, RMP*Comp alone is used because it does not 
require a predetermined dataset.  
In all, by evaluating the RMP hazard assessment and risk analysis of an OCA, an 
emergency management professional can recognize that, though catastrophic chemical 
accidents may be infrequent, they can have a significant impact on the public perception 
of chemical facilities, and pose risks to the environment and the community’s health and 
safety. More importantly, information provided by an OCA can identify critical 
vulnerabilities and risks within a community should a chemical facility have an offsite 
release.  
The RMP covers “77 toxic and 63 flammable substances” that pose the greatest 
risk, including: “death, injury or serious adverse effects to human health or the 
                                                 
43 CEPP, Risk Management Program Guidance. 
44 “What is the CAMEO Software Suite?” EPA, accessed June 14, 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/cameo/ 
what-cameo-software-suite. 
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environment.”45 The RMP program places and categorizes facilities into three programs: 
Program 1, 2, or 3. RMP program levels are determined by the regulatory agencies and 
the risk management program itself with the assessment of offsite receptor, accidental 
history, and the applicability of either the RMP or PSM program. Processes with an OCA 
that unlikely affect any offsite public receptors under a worst-case scenario are placed in 
Program 1. Program 1 has a minimal set of requirements as opposed to the higher levels 
of regulation. Program 2 imposes additional requirements on hazard assessments, worst-
case and alternative-case scenarios, written operating procedures, employee training with 
safety and operating procedures, maintaining mechanical integrity of all equipment, 
investigations of all accidental releases, and internal compliance audits every three years. 
Program 2 facilities have limited offsite receptors in the event of a worse-case scenario. 
Program 3 facilities, the most regulated and demanding of all program levels due to the 
magnitude of potential harm. The facility is required to do everything defined within 
Program 2, and more. Additional requirements include identifying process safety 
information and parameters, conducting a process hazard analysis, writing extensive 
operating procedures to manage the replacement of a process or equipment (otherwise 
known as management of change), conducting pre-startup safety reviews on any modified 
stationary sources that required a change in the process safety information, and 
employees participating during all aspects of the RMP, hot work permit program, and 
contractor program.  
Within each program, each facility must prepare an accidental release history 
from the previous five years.46 Facilities, as required by RMP, must conduct an OCA 
scenario to determine their worst-case and alternative accidental release scenarios. OCA 
identifies locations at risk and potential impact upon a release of hazardous materials. All 
Program 1, 2, and 3 facilities are also required to submit a summary report every five 
years to the EPA called the Risk Management Plan Submit (RMP Submit), which 
includes an executive summary and the facility’s emergency response plan. Process 
Hazard Analysis (PHA) allows a facility to determine and document the priority order for 
                                                 
45 40 CFR 68, Subpart F, Sec. 68.130. 
46 40 CFR 68, Sec. 42. 
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conducting a hazard assessment on the apparent risk associated with the process.47 
Allowed methodologies of PHAs include: What-If Analysis,48 Checklist, What-If/
Checklist,49 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study,50 Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis,51 Fault Tree Analysis,52 or an appropriate or equivalent methodology.53 The 
PHA must address: 
• The hazard of the process 
• The identification of any previous incidents that had potential for 
catastrophic consequences in the workplace 
• Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their 
interrelationships, such as appropriate application of detection 
methodologies to provide early warning of releases. Acceptable detection 
methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation 
with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors 
• Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls 
• Facility siting 
• Human factors 
• A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safely and health effects 
on employees in the workplace if there is a failure of controls.54  
                                                 
47 “Process Safety Management,” OSHA, accessed January 11, 2016, https://www.osha.gov/ 
Publications/osha3132.html. 
48 A scenario-based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach, in which typically a 
team that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices concerns 
about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and if the existing safeguards are adequate. 
“Safety & Health Management Systems eTool,” OSHA, accessed January 14, 2015, https://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/etools/safetyhealth/mod4_tools_methodologies.html.  
49 Ibid. A What-If Analysis that uses some form of checklist or other listing of broad categories of 
concern to structure the what-if questioning.  
50 Ibid. A scenario-based hazard evaluation procedure in which a team uses a series of guide words to 
identify possible deviations from the intended design or operation of a process, then examines the potential 
consequences of the deviations and the adequacy of existing safeguards.  
51 Ibid. A systematic, tabular method for evaluating and documenting the effects of known types of 
component failures. 
52 Ibid. A logic model that graphically portrays the combinations of failures that can lead to a specific 
main failure or incident of interest.  
53 Robert B. Reich and Joseph A. Dear, Process Safety Management Guidelines for Compliance 
(OSHA 3133) (Washington, DC: OSHA, 1994). 
54 Reich and Dear, Process Safety Management Guidelines. 
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The purpose of the PHA is to hold the facility responsible for adequately 
identifying and assessing the hazard. The facility must then address the findings and 
recommendations to ensure resolutions in a timely manner.55 A thorough PHA should be 
the foundation for a chemical facility to strategically analyze the equipment, safety 
systems, and operating procedures for handling regulated substances in their various 
processes. It is also a way to potentially analyze accident scenarios. In essence, the PHA 
has the ability to identify the failures that could occur and the analysis of the likelihood of 
the release occurring. In totality, the findings from the PHA should then focus on 
ensuring redundancy of safety systems, plans, and mitigation measures in place will 
function properly and effectively to eliminate or lessen the impact from an accidental 
release.  
To put this all in perspective, an EPA study identified 123 high-risk chemical 
facilities in the United States with worst-case scenarios that would put one million 
individuals at risk from exposure to a toxic or flammable vapor cloud should an 
accidental release occur.56 The study additionally identifies 600 other high-risk chemical 
facilities with worst-case scenarios that threaten populations between 100,000 and one 
million. This total does not include the 2,300 other high-risk chemical facilities that have 
a worst-case scenario affecting a population or receptor of 10,000 to 100,000 should a 
toxic or flammable vapor cloud be catastrophically released.57 According to the EPA, 
there are 12,743 national facilities currently regulated under RMP. In EPA Region IX 
alone, there are 1,780 RMP facilities.58  
The number of high-risk U.S. chemical facilities is statistically alarming when 
considering governing regulatory agencies are unable to conduct routine inspections due 
                                                 
55 EPA, “Process Hazard Analysis,” Chemical Emergency Prevention & Planning Newsletter, July–
August 2008, http://www3.epa.gov/region10/pdf/rmp/cepp_newsletter_0708.pdf. 
56 John Stephenson, Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of 
Security Preparedness is Unknown (GAO-03-439) (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 
2003), 4. 
57 Stephenson, Voluntary Initiatives, 4. 
58 FedEPA Region IX includes Arizona, Hawaii, Nevada, California, and Pacific Islands. “Pacific 
Southwest, Region 9,” EPA, accessed June 11, 2015, http://www.epa.gov/region9/enforcement/.  
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to limited resources and often proper training.59 Because of this, some states have 
developed additional and more restrictive reporting thresholds on top of the federal RMP 
program. During the writing of this thesis, legislative proposals to amend the PSM and 
RMP programs may potentially create regulations and policy to improve chemical safety 
and security throughout at these high-risk facilities.  
The function of many of our critical infrastructures and key resources depend 
upon the chemical sector. A catastrophic attack on a key chemical facility would cause 
devastating and cascading reaction effects on other sectors. So, not only would a 
catastrophic release affect a community and the environment, it may potentially cause a 
compounding effect on the global economy. 
More recently, Presidential Executive Order 13650 (EO 13650) mandates the 
establishment of the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, combining 
DHS, the EPA, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, Department of 
Transportation, and Department of Labor to improve operational coordination with state, 
local, and chemical industries.60 EO 13650 was initiated due to the West, Texas 
ammonium nitrate explosion on April 17, 2013. The order focuses on several areas of 
effort to enhance federal coordination; information collection and sharing; regulation 
modernization; guidance, policy, and standards; and best practices. The working group, 
led by the EPA, has been developing operational and coordinating plans to further enable 
all stakeholders (including state regulators, emergency responders, industry, and 
communities) “to work together to improve chemical facility safety and preparedness.”61  
Key concepts for review and establishment include engagement with regulatory 
agencies in the local emergency planning process. EO 13650’s scope is to improve the 
training of first responders to include technical assistance with prevention and 
preparedness at the SERC and LEPC levels. Electronic reporting and data management 
between agencies are also to be improved. Improving public access to information about 
                                                 
59 EPA Office of Inspector General, Report: Improvements Needed in EPA Training and Oversight for 
Risk Management Program Inspections (Report No. 13-P-0178) (Washington, DC: EPA, March 2013).   
60 Exec. Order No. 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (2013). 
61 Exec. Order No. 13650. 
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chemical facilities while simultaneously protecting security and sensitive information is 
also required by EO 13650. With EO 13650, the collaborative efforts may facilitate the 
working relationships that are needed to ensure the safety of our first responders and 
communities from chemical disasters. 
The United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) was created by Congress as part 
of the 1990 CAA amendments to investigate chemical-related industrial accidents. As a 
separate and non-governed agency, Congress gave the CSB the authority to fully 
investigate and identify the causes of accidents without any direct oversight from other 
agencies or the executive branch. Its focus is to merely understand the circumstances that 
led to, and to determine the cause of, the chemical accident. It is simple to identify 
unanticipated chemical reactions or hazards, mechanical or process equipment failures, or 
lack of training, but it is harder to truly get to the bottom of those reasons of failure. The 
CSB identifies the root causes of deficiencies within the safety management systems that 
may have resulted in the disaster. Common root causes of failures may include human 
error, inefficient safety culture within the organization or facility, or a gap in regulatory 
oversight.62 In addition, the CSB also makes recommendations to OSHA and EPA to 
review the effectiveness of regulations and their enforcement.63 A number of regulatory 
safety gaps have been identified by the CSB to OSHA and EPA in the RMP and PSM 
programs. Effective safety management systems are essential, as are key concepts that 
require high-risk chemical facilities to operate and function at a higher level of 
stewardship in safety. These concepts protect facilities’ vested interest in their 
employees, investors, products, profits, communities, first responders, and the 
environment.64 
                                                 
62 “Mission,” CSB, accessed October 3, 2015, http://www.csb.gov/about-the-csb/mission.  
63 CSB Homepage, accessed October 3, 2015, http://www.csb.gov.  
64 The case studies in this thesis are and have been investigated by the CSB. These case studies have 
also resulted, and will yet result, in a number of regulatory changes to improve the safety of facilities that 
handle hazardous materials. An analytical review of those results will assist the community as a whole to 
utilize those findings to better prepare for a chemical disaster.  
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B. THE TERRORIST FACTOR 
A study conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory asserts that 
motivational and social factors affect terrorist organizations’ predisposition to attack 
chemical facilities.65 The study investigated three predominant questions:  
• Why do terrorists choose to attack chemical-related infrastructures over 
other targets?  
• What specific factors influence their target selection decisions concerning 
chemical facilities? 
• Which, if any, types of groups are most inclined to attack chemical 
infrastructure targets?66  
In this particular literature, the assessment defined critical chemical infrastructure and its 
significance regarding both the economy and public safety. The study also delves into 
other terrorism-related threat assessments and industry-specific literature, presenting a 
well-rounded approach for identifying high-risk chemical facilities that are targets of 
interest for acts of terrorism. Government reports, chemical industry analysis, studies 
conducted by environmental organizations, and other sources were used to establish the 
threat of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities. Most of the research was conducted after 
9/11 and mainly focused on possible effects of a successful terrorist attack against a 
chemical facility or the existing security vulnerabilities of chemical facilities. Because no 
previous studies had examined terrorist motivations for attacking chemical facilities, the 
Lawrence Livermore study provided valuable insight into how critical chemical 
infrastructures might best be understood in the context of counterterrorism. It also 
indicated a wide range of motivations that may or may not cause terrorists to attack 
critical chemical infrastructures. In general, the study highlights that terrorists target 
chemical infrastructures to accomplish operational objectives that fall into one or more 
discrete categories, such as mass casualties, physical destruction, environmental 
contamination, economic downfall or disruption, disruption of strategic industrial 
                                                 
65 G. Ackerman et al., Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Chemical Infrastructure 
(UCRL-TR-227068) (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 2004). 
66 Ackerman et al., Assessing Terrorist Motivations. 
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functions, or acquisition of chemicals for weapons. This is done to directly and indirectly 
influence or establish their social identity within a terrorist network.67 
By recognizing that certain chemical facilities can be catastrophically damaged, 
terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) could sidestep many of the 
technical and resource hurdles associated with building such weapons by simply 
attacking a high-risk chemical facility. Chemical facilities are present in populated areas 
and near other key critical infrastructures and major routes of transportation. This 
provides additional potential targets for terrorists to leverage into cascading failures. 
Livermore’s study, in particular, also identifies that the majority of the country’s critical 
chemical infrastructures remain inadequately secured. Despite the recognition that 
chemical facilities can be attacked with catastrophic consequences, little has been done to 
enhance physical security around most chemical facilities. As a consequence, chemical 
facilities remain vulnerable targets.  
The Lawrence Livermore study reviewed incidents chronologically from 1933 to 
2004. Within that time frame, low incidents of terrorist attacks against chemical 
infrastructures occurred. The majority of cases identified suggested that the primary 
motivation behind the attacks was opposition to ruling governments. This suggests that 
external terrorist threats against the chemical sector may not be as likely as they seem. 
Yet, in the world of terrorism, tactics and mindsets are always evolving. The overriding 
conclusion of these case studies is that terrorists are capable of attacks on chemical 
infrastructures. If such a mindset exists within a terrorist organization, significant damage 
could truly harm and impact first responders, communities, and the environment.68 
Potential catastrophic damage of the chemical sector could manifest as a coordinated 
attack on a number of facilities, leading to cascading effects on other industries or 
                                                 
67 Social identity theory offers an understanding of terrorist organizations’ motivational objectives, 
whether related to in-group or out-group cohesion, or external factors; it is an effective methodology to 
analytically understand terrorist groups and their actions. David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders 
Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way forward: Terrorism Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Research and 
Technology, 2014), 153. 
68 Ackerman et al., Assessing Terrorist Motivations. 
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infrastructures, accompanied by mass causalities and widespread economic instability.69 
Because an incident of such scale would require a coordinated effort by groups of 
individuals with specific scientific or technical knowledge, however, an attack on a 
chemical facility by a terrorist organization is less likely to occur than a failure from a 
non-deliberate act causing a chemical disaster. A community’s safety is best guaranteed 
with an all-hazards approach. The Livermore study concludes that the community must 
understand its hazards and the importance of identifying vulnerabilities for community 
preparedness. 
C. THEORIES OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) directs the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to coordinate the nation’s effort in identifying, prioritizing, and 
protecting critical infrastructure and key resources.70 Presidential Policy Directive 21, 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, replaced HSPD-7 in 2013.71 The 16 
critical infrastructure sectors assess vulnerabilities by utilizing risk strategies to protect 
and mitigate terrorist attacks against those identified critical infrastructures. As stipulated 
by HSPD-7, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was created.72 The NIPP 
ultimately provides a strategy of actionable objectives to reduce the vulnerabilities of 
those sectors. The 2013 NIPP identified its main goals as to:  
• Evaluate and analyze critical infrastructure threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences to information risk management 
• Address multiple threats through sustainable efforts to reduce risk; 
account for costs and benefits of security investments 
• Enhance critical infrastructure resilience; minimize the adverse 
consequences of incidents, as well as conduct effective responses 
                                                 
69 Margaret E. Kosal, Chemical Terrorism: U.S. Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat. 
(Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology, September 2008).  
70 Department of Homeland Security, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection (HSPD-7) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2003).  
71 “Critical Infrastructure Sectors, “Department of Homeland Security, accessed July 15, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors. 
72 Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
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• Share actionable and relevant information across the critical infrastructure 
community to build awareness and enable risk-informed decision 
making73 
According to the Interagency Security Committee, “Risk is a function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences. The objective of risk management is to create a level of 
protection that mitigates vulnerabilities to threats and the potential consequence, thereby 
reducing risk to an acceptable level.”74 There are many models and methodologies that 
assess threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, all of which can be integrated to determine risk. 
Roper’s Risk Management for Security Professionals, for example, provides clear 
guidance for the methodology and assessments.75 One way Roper suggests risk can be 
calculated through critical assessments that identify assets and characterize those assets’ 
vulnerability to specific threats.76 From that, risk reduction and prioritization of risk 
reduction activities can be identified and implemented. All of this is, of course, 
predicated upon a reproducible process for risk measurement. 
Roper’s methodology identifies assets within the community, activities and 
operations, information, businesses, and equipment.77 He asserts that not every asset is as 
important as another; all assessments must be analyzed according to the asset’s criticality. 
In order to assess resources, assets judged to be most critical are provided prioritization. 
Should the loss of a particular asset threaten the survival or prosperity of those who 
depend on it, the higher it falls on the criticality spectrum. Consequences can be 
separated and identified with end results related to factors that are economic, financial, 
environmental, health and safety related, technological, operational, or timeliness 
related.78 For example, a facility has identified that their decrepit process control center 
                                                 
73 Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013. 
74 Interagency Security Committee, The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An 
Interagency Security Committee Standard (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
75 Carl A. Roper, Risk Management for Security Professionals (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 
1999).  
76 Roper, Risk Management. 
77 Ibid. 
78 John Moteff, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and 
Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences (CRS Report No. RL32561) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005).  
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could potentially fail, causing a catastrophic system failure with a chemical release. 
Knowing that the replacement of this equipment would cause significant downtime, 
resulting in a disruption to production and a loss in revenue—coupled with the capital 
costs associated with replacing the failing component—the facility chooses to spend its 
money elsewhere for the time being until the components reaches failure point. The 
consequences resulted from an asset’s failure to reduce associated risks for a number of 
reasons, one being its priority was on competitive advantage and financial costs rather 
than safety. While the immediate impact of the incident may be significant, the social 
ramification and resources required to replace those lost assets may be invaluable.  
To identify, characterize, and assess threat, Roper first defines threat as “any 
indication, circumstance or event with the potential to cause loss or damage to an 
asset.”79 He further explains that, in order to fully assess threat, one should consider the 
evaluation of insider, terrorist, military, or environmental threats. The intent, motivational 
factors, capabilities, methods, and trends all change depending on the course of 
objectives.  
Risk also implies uncertain consequences. HSPD-7 provides guidance to help 
facilities identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of key assets that have the 
potential to cause epidemic outbreaks with mass causalities, similar to the effects of 
WMDs.80 Much greater criticality should be given to loss of life consequences by those 
incidents.  
  
                                                 
79 Roper, Risk Management, 43. 
80 The Chemical Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan offers 
a unifying structure to achieve the NIPP’s goal. Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Sector-
Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Currently, there is a disconnect between emergency management professionals, 
governing regulatory agencies, and industry that hinders their ability to work effectively 
together to recognize, plan, and prepare for chemical disasters. Though emergency 
response plans for hazardous materials emergencies do exist in communities, they have 
not addressed several common failures that are root causes of chemical disasters. 
Addressing these root causes would greatly enhance prevention. Furthermore, 
communities lack a common framework for understanding how to communicate, 
regulate, and recognize risks effectively. In essence, though emergency response plans do 
exist, without a framework to implement them communities have not assessed nor 
prepared for hazardous materials disasters. The objective of this study is to understand 
the root causes of those failures and, using those causes as lessons learned, to create a 
framework that a community can use to collaboratively prevent and better prepare for 
chemical disasters. The proposed framework provides solutions on how to effectively 
work together to analyze risks and identify high-risk chemical facilities’ vulnerabilities, 
as well as how regulations and communication can help stakeholders prepare for 
chemical disasters. This framework can then be used to develop and implement a plan 
that would better assist in coordination and resource allocation in the event of a 
hazardous materials incident. 
A. MODE OF ANALYSIS 
This thesis is organized into chapters and sections that help the reader understand 
the elements used to create the suggested framework. Two case studies were evaluated, 
each involving a chemical disaster within a community. Each case study discusses the 
failures, synthesizes the root cause of the failures, and identifies three main disconnects 
related to emergency management, the regulatory framework, and industry. The mode of 
analysis is the evaluation of these failures, which helps determine the likelihood and 
severity of the risks and the resulting consequences. 
 32 
Chapter IV introduces the suggested framework by providing background 
information related to hazard assessments and the necessary framework for analyzing the 
case studies. Chapters V and VI present the case studies, beginning with a brief overview 
of the incident, followed by a detailed evaluation of the incident that identifies the root 
cause of its failures. Each case study is analyzed by comparing the actions or safeguards 
taken against those ignored, and how that impacted the community. These case studies 
synthesize, in detail, the root cause of the failures as well as the resulting casualties, 
property damage, business interruption, and environmental damage.  
After the case studies are analyzed, Chapter VII offers solutions that communities 
can use to address the root causes found in those case studies. The elements of this new 
framework allow communities to learn from their mistakes and improve their overall 
safety culture. The ability to recognize effective safeguards and to develop a safety 
culture is another key piece of the puzzle; “Safety culture is a considered a subcomponent 
of corporate culture, which alludes to individual, job and organizational features that 
affect and influence safety.”81 Effective leadership must develop, communicate, and 
implement the safety culture change process. This process must be proactive and must 
involve all levels of management and individuals. 
B. SELECTION 
The two case studies were selected from several large-scale hazardous materials 
chemical industrial accidents that resulted in injuries, death, economic disruption, and 
environmental damage. All the accidents analyzed have identical failures and root causes 
that could have been prevented. In addition, each case study displays catastrophic failures 
from non-deliberate acts such as a mechanical failure, failure of the safety culture, and 
regulatory inconsistencies. The impacts of those failures could have been greatly 
diminished if protective measures that were identified had actually been implemented. 
This is a result of a failure to recognize the urgency or significance of failure in a 
particular element of the process.  
                                                 
81 Dominic Cooper, “Safety Culture: A Model for Understanding & Quantifying a Difficult Concept,” 
Professional Safety, June 2002: 30–36. 
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The case study analyses allow for the identification of key concepts and root 
causes of the chemical disasters. It is important to understand the existing regulatory 
framework in which these incidents occurred. Many states rely solely on the federal 
government’s existing regulatory framework. The two case studies presented exist in 
states that have two very different, yet similar, regulatory frameworks: California and 
Texas. Both states have different regulatory environment and presence, yet the same root 
causes of failure can still be identified. The concept and the intent of the California 
program is distinguished from other state and federal regulatory authorities. Data include 
a facility’s chemical inventory, emergency response procedures, site maps, and 
identification of hazards associated with their processes as well as their risk assessment. 
Dissemination of the data is also important to understand if the program and the 
information provided are intended to safeguard communities and first responders. Even in 
California’s more restrictive regulatory framework, there are missed core failures within 
safety compliance and safety culture.  
With the careful selection of case studies and understanding of risks and 
regulatory frameworks, the analysis and evaluation of the information can be combined 
to create a model that identifies vulnerabilities and risks associated with high-hazard 
materials facilities, and that helps determine the likelihood of failures and the resulting 
impacts. By understanding and identifying the impacts, a community can better prepare 
for and prevent chemical emergencies. 
C. DATA SOURCES 
Data sources come from the open literature, inventory reports, process hazard 
analysis reports, incident investigations, and inspection records of the case studies. The 
two case studies considered in this thesis were:  
• The West Fertilizer Company explosion in West, Texas 
• The Chevron Refinery fire in Richmond, California  
Data sources for the West Fertilizer Company explosion include investigations 
conducted by the CSB, inspection reports from regulatory agencies, open literature, and 
incident and analytical findings. The analysis focuses on the safety culture at this facility. 
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The focus of this data collection was the failures to recognize a hazard’s severity, as well 
as the need for community preparedness and understanding of risks associated with 
chemical facilities. This case study emphasizes the regulatory differences and first 
responder knowledge about these types of hazardous materials facilities. The importance 
of this case study is to acknowledge the various existing regulatory frameworks for the 
value and significance of data sharing and regulatory oversight, and the need for 
community preparedness. By grouping the data by the risk analyses and identified 
failures, this study identifies the root causes of the failure to recognize risk.  
Analysis of the Chevron Refinery accident includes investigations conducted by 
the CSB, inspection reports from regulatory agencies, an open literature review, and 
incident and analytical findings, including the failure to recognize the hazard and 
actionable prioritization of consequences and impacts. Impacts of failed mechanical 
systems and inappropriate identification of failed communication within a community 
resulted in a catastrophic release of a hazardous material into a community, resulting in 
injuries, casualties, damage to the environment, business interruption, economic burden, 
and change to regulatory oversight. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
This study does not complete a summative evaluation and does not make 
generalizations about risk analysis and its effectiveness; it merely identifies common 
failures and their root causes in order to help communities learn from those failures and 
adequately prepare for a chemical disaster. Ultimately, this study aims to increase the 
community’s ability—as a whole—to recognize risks and to prevent, protect from, and 
prepare for those risks. The case studies and their risk assessments should be evaluated in 
terms of consequences and impact, and action prioritization should be based on the 
likelihood and severity of a chemical disaster. The process hazards analysis and 
protective measures should be evaluated based on if the identified risk is actionable and 
effective. Evaluating each case study’s chemical disaster according to its PHA may 
reflect missed or wrongly categorized risk associated with a risk matrix.  
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The case studies in this thesis do not represent all hazards, but are restricted to 
mechanical/process equipment and organizational, regulatory, and human failures. As a 
side note, catastrophic failures of a high-risk chemical facility arising from a natural 
disaster have far more catastrophic consequences than detailed in this thesis. However, if 
hazards are evaluated correctly, natural disasters most certainly can be considered within 
the present framework, since they would have similar requirements for protective 
measures, stakeholder collaboration, and community preparedness to lessen the risk. 
Therefore, plant vulnerabilities and their identified risks arising from hazard assessments 
that include mechanical failures, personnel failures, and natural disasters would have far-
reaching effects that would also protect communities from acts of terrorism and sabotage. 
This study shows that an all-hazards approach to risk analysis provides a high-risk 
chemical facility the ability to allocate its protective investments in a manner that would 
also encompass terrorism.  
As mentioned previously, the regulatory framework in each case study’s state 
must be taken into consideration. California’s framework should be carefully assessed. 
California is a large state that encompasses various demographics and diverse 
communities that represent much of the United States; it has communities that are urban, 
suburban, and rural with integrated industrial, agricultural, and manufacturing facilities. 
The regulatory framework in California (described later in this thesis) may not work for 
every state. Many rural communities do not have the ability or resources necessary to 
conduct studies and must rely on either the state or federal government to conduct them. 
In many communities throughout the United States, the collection and dissemination of 
data from chemical facilities is vastly different. Comparing options when seeking the 
right regulatory framework is important since a key element for successful consequence 
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IV. A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE THE CASE STUDIES
To help gain an understanding of the framework, several key terms must first be 
defined: 
Incident: “An unexpected and usually unpleasant thing that happens.”82 
In this thesis, incident is an event or series of events that result in an adverse 
impact or exposure to an employee, contractor, property, community, or the 
environment.  
Near miss: “An accident that is just barely avoided.”83 
In this thesis, a near miss is an unplanned event that had the potential for injury 
or damage to property, environment, social and economic reputation, or financial 
performance.  
Hazard: “A source of danger.”84 
In this thesis, a hazard refers to the presence of a dangerous material or 
condition—such as a large inventory of a toxic gas—where loss of control could 
lead to casualties, property damage, interruption losses, and/or environmental 
damage.  
Risk Analysis: “A procedure in the identification of risks by analyzing 
them to understand the potential failures, and to assess how to eliminate or 
reduce those risks.”85  
In this thesis, a risk analysis is an estimate of frequency and severity of undesired 
events.  
82 Mirriam-Webster, s.v. “Incident,” accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/incident.  
83 Mirriam-Webster, s.v. “Near miss,” accessed January 14, 2016,http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/near%20miss. 
84 Mirriam-Webster, s.v. “Hazard,” accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/hazard. 
85 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC Guide 27001:2009: Information 
Technology—Security Techniques—Information Security Management Systems—Requirements (Geneva, 
Switzerland: ISO, 2013).  
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Safeguard: “Something that provides protection against possible loss, 
damage, etc.”86 
In this thesis, a safeguard is a physical device, a process, system, or action that 
would interrupt the sequence of initiating event or that would mitigate or lessen 
an impact from a loss event.87  
 
A. THE REVIEW PROCESS 
Using risk analysis, an emergency management professional can measure and 
quantify risk. A significant vulnerability with little or no safeguards in place exhibits high 
likelihood of a release or failure, resulting in significant risk. Conversely, having a low 
vulnerability and substantial safeguard will likely reduce the risk of a release or a failure. 
It is important to remember, however, that if the impact is substantially low and the risk 
inconsequential or acceptable, safeguards may not be necessary.  
Hazard identification starts by surveying the nature of materials and the use 
conditions. All hazardous materials have their own hazard properties based on the 
chemical composition and physical, chemical, and toxicological properties, such as 
flammability, reactivity, corrosivity, vapor pressure, boiling point, and toxicity. Other use 
conditions considered should be the temperature and pressure of the material, ambient 
temperatures, and the proximity to other chemicals. A hazard assessment can help 
identify the risks and vulnerabilities associated with a process and its equipment.88 
B. ANATOMY OF AN INCIDENT 
An incident event (see Table 1) can transform the threat posed by a process 
hazard into an occurrence. The first event in an incident is known as the initiating cause 
or initiating event. An initiating event can be identified or predicted during a PHA as an 
anticipated system process failure mode or system perturbation. Any operation outside of 
normal is considered a deviation with potential incident outcomes if system control 
                                                 
86 Mirriam-Webster, s.v. “Safeguard,” accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/safeguard. 
87 Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Wiley-Interscience, 2008), xxvi. 
88 CCPS, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, xxiv. 
 39 
safeguards are not put into place. The severity of consequences of the loss event is 
considered the impact. The impact can be a measure of the loss and harm from the event, 
such as the number of injuries and/or fatalities, environmental and/or property damage, 
material loss, production and recovery costs, or a combination of these factors.89 
Table 1.   Potential Hazard Events at Chemical Facilities 
Process Hazards Initiating Causes Incident Outcomes 







• Physical conditions of 




• Containment failures 
o Pipes, vessels 
 
• Equipment malfunctions 





• Loss of necessary 
utilities 
 
• Human error 
 





• Loss events 
o Release, fire, 
explosion 
 





• Loss of production, 
monetary revenue 
Adapted from EPA. “Clean Air Act 112(r) Risk Management Program (RMP),” Chemical 
Emergency Prevention & Planning Newsletter, July–August 2008, http://www3.epa.gov/region10/
pdf/rmp/cepp_newsletter_0708.pdf.  
 
                                                 
89 CCPS, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, xxiv. 
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C. SAFEGUARDS 
Safeguards are engineered systems or administrative controls that prevent a 
failure within a chemical process.90 Safeguards can protect against system deviations that 
can progress to a loss event, but can also mitigate the immediate loss event. Safeguards 
fall into three basic classifications: 
• Safety systems in place within a process that assist with process failure 
• Detection and monitoring devices that provide early warning following the 
release of a hazardous or flammable material 
• Written operating procedures that mitigate the human factor to prevent the 
release of hazardous or flammable material 
Different safeguards can have different functions, depending on whether they are 
preventative or mitigative safeguards. A preventative safeguard or an active layer of 
control serves to achieve a safe state of operation when the process has gone awry; it is 
able to disrupt an initiating cause factor and prevent the loss event(s) from following. 
Preventative safeguards do not affect the likelihood of initiating causes, but do affect the 
probability of a loss event given an initiating cause. Therefore, the preventative safeguard 
affects the overall scenario frequency. An example of a preventative safeguard may 
include an automatic safety system, such as pressure valve relieving overpressure from a 
pressurized vessel. Another example would be a safety alarm, which prompt’s the 
equipment operator to manually shut down the process before a system failure can occur. 
Preventive safeguards also affect the overall scenario frequency to avoid a loss event or a 
more severe loss event from occurring. In order to avoid a loss event from a mechanical 
equipment failure, for example, a control or design safeguard would automatically shut 
down the system when it detects an inconsistency to prevent failure. Preventative 
safeguards can also include existing mechanical integrity, preventative maintenance, 
inspection, testing, operator training, backup systems, and automatic/manual process 
controls. A mitigative safeguard or a passive safety control, on the other hand, is 
designed to reduce the severity of consequences of a loss event. Mitigative safeguards 
directly affect safety, business, community, and environmental impacts resulting from a 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
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fire, explosion, toxic release, or other irreversible physical events.91 Examples of these 
safeguards may include secondary containment, flammable/release detection sensors, 
blast-resistant supports, isolation valves, deluge systems, and emergency response and 
emergency management planning. The objective of a mitigative safeguard is to detect and 
respond to emergency situations in such a way as to reduce the impacts of loss events.  
In addition to mitigative and preventative safeguards, inherently safe approaches 
and methods of reducing risks include:  
• Eliminating by removing the hazard  
• Substituting by replacing or lowering concentrations of a lesser hazardous 
material 
• Minimizing the quantity of chemical stored, used, or generated 
• Modifying operations to inherently safer designs 
• Isolating or moving the hazard further away from a sensitive receptor 
Recognizing key mitigative and/or preventative safeguards is essential for an 
emergency management professional during a facility’s safety review. Identifying 
safeguards can directly prevent a catastrophic release from occurring or can lessen the 
impact should a release of a hazardous material occur As shown in Figure 2, safeguards 
should be put in place at all levels of the process to lessen the impact. 
  
                                                 
91 CCPS, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 28. 
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Figure 2.  Role of Safeguards in the Event Process 
 
The safeguards can be used to reduce each of the contributions to the failure chain, 
reducing the overall impact. Adapted from Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 
2008), 218, Figure 7.4. 
Inherently safer designs integrated into a chemical process ultimately reduce the 
risk of a catastrophic and cascading failure by reducing the consequence should an 
impact or hazard occur.92 The more advanced the system is according to the hierarchy of 
controls (seen in Figure 3), the more effective the risk reduction.  
  
                                                 
92 CCPS, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes—A Life Cycle Approach, 2nd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley, 2009), section 2.1.  
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Figure 3.  Hierarchy of Controls 
 
The control methods at the top of the chart are often viewed as being more effective and 
protective than those at the bottom. Source: “Hierarchy of Controls,” CDC, last modified 
April 21, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hierarchy.  
Inherently safer principles rely on risk reduction through: 1) avoiding hazards, 2) 
reducing severity, and 3) reducing likelihood. Currently, there are no regulatory 
requirements for chemical facilities to analyze or evaluate their process design equipment 
to use inherently safer technologies. The reduction of process hazards using hierarchical 
controls—with safe designs at the top of the hierarchy—should always been evaluated. 
Ultimately, an inherently safer system will reduce the risk of injury and exposure to both 
the employees and community. 
The process of investigating an incident allows an emergency management 
professional to understand and evaluate trends to identify root causes that may have 
contributed to the incident. Incident investigations are often triggered by one or multiple 
occurrences, such as injury/fatality, fire, loss of production or profit, regulatory 
requirement after a release or injury, or mainstream media or social media. One of the 
hardest aspects of evaluating root causes is analyzing for trends and systemic issues. By 
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determining and sharing lessons learned, many of these incident investigations can be 
applied across fields to prevent similar accidents. 
D. KEY HAZARD EVALUATION OBJECTIVES: THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Controls needed to mitigate hazards can only be established if the hazards have 
been identified and evaluated. The following list provides examples of key hazard 
evaluations that an emergency management professional or a risk analysis professional 
should be evaluating:  
• Identify chemical reactions that could cause runaway reactions, fires, 
explosions, or toxic gas releases  
• Identify process safety data  
• Identify possibilities of alternate inherently safer chemicals, process, or 
units 
• Incorporate an inherently safer design of process 
• Compare hazards of from nearby sites 
• Seek other historical incidents and lessons learned on similar facilities 
within the industry 
• Identify facility siting 
• Identify and understand the ways hazardous materials may be released into 
the environment through the process 
• Identify potential hazardous operator interfaces 
• Determine who may be impacted or affected 
• Strive for source and waste reduction 
• Identify detailed engineering of flammable/toxic mixtures forming inside 
process equipment 
• Develop a report and notification process for spills 
• Develop a process for mitigating a release 
• Develop emergency response procedures 
• Identify process control malfunctions that can cause runaway reactions 
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• Evaluate preventative and mitigative safeguards for effectiveness 
• Identify safety-critical equipment for routine maintenance testing, 
inspection, and frequency of replacement 
• Identify issues during start-up and operating procedures 
• Verify previously identified deficiencies and intolerable risks have been 
corrected 
• Identify hazards associated with vessels, piping, cleaning procedures, 
safety, shutdowns, emergency operations, and standard (routine) 
operations 
• Identify employee hazards associated with operating procedures 
• Identify hazards associated with new, existing, or out-of-service process 
equipment 
• Track historical data concerning natural disasters such as tornados, 
hurricanes, floods, fires, or earthquakes 
• Identify target attractiveness to social, political, or environmental threats 
These factors and many more create a roadmap to assist emergency management 
and the community. When identifying the infrastructure, a detailed review should be 
conducted to prepare for, prevent, and mitigate the effects of a chemical incident. In 
identifying the hazard evaluation objectives, the results should pinpoint if vulnerabilities 
have been identified and if there are layers of protection or safeguards in place to lower 
those vulnerabilities and, ultimately, to reduce risk.  
After process hazards have been identified, it is essential to review the worst-case 
scenario consequences for the identified hazard. This achieves several objectives. For 
each of the hazards of concern, the consequences show the radius/distance and the 
estimated impact in terms of number of persons or receptors potentially affected. The 
assessment will calculate a distance to end point for a worst-case scenario and will then 
determine the impacts on surrounding populations, buildings, and equipment. The 
method of hazard assessment within the EPA’s RMP Rule is one of the chosen sources to 
determine the worst-case scenario distance for toxic releases, fires, and vapor cloud 
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explosions involving high-risk chemicals. The RMP*Comp modeling is used in this 
study. 
E. UNDERSTANDING RISK 
Determining the need for action comes with two issues:  
• Risk estimation—the likelihood and severity 
• Risk assessment—action needed qualifier 
The need for action, including a process or procedure change, is based on the 
level of risk for each scenario. Risk is commonly defined as the product of consequences 
(hazard) and frequency (likelihood) with the effectiveness of safeguards.93 
 
 
Risk is estimated by orders of magnitude, as are the frequencies, using a ranking 
scheme.94 The higher the rank number, the higher the severity of the consequence; the 
higher the frequency or likelihood of the event to occur, the higher the category it is 
given. These are placed into a risk matrix (see Table 2) and used to assist the risk 
manager.95 A risk analysis matrix provides one measure of acceptable risk and 
understanding of frequency of failures and the magnitude of consequences. Though these 
risk matrices are highly granular, they can be used effectively when identifying hazards 
related to chemical facilities.  
  
                                                 
93 CCPS, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, Section 2.1. 
94 CCPS, Guidelines for Chemical Process.   
95 J. S. Arendt and D. K. Lorenzo, Evaluating Process Safety in the Chemical Industry: A Manager’s 
Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2000). 
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Hazard analysis identifies hazards and the effects of the reasonable worst-case 
scenario impacts associated with that hazard. Risks associated with the facility’s process 
must first be identified and assessed in order to determine if the safeguards implemented 
are sufficient or if additional layers of protection are required.  
Hazard categories for the severity of the consequence identified commonly in 
industry standards are as follows:  
• Hazard Category 1: Negligible 
• Hazard Category 2: Low 
• Hazard Category 3: Moderate 
• Hazard Category 4: Significant 
• Hazard Category 5: Catastrophic 
 
The frequency or the likelihood of the initiating event commonly identified in 
industry standards can be identified as: 
• Likelihood Category 1: Improbable 
• Likelihood Category 2: Remote 
• Likelihood Category 3: Occasional 
• Likelihood Category 4: Probable 
• Likelihood Category 5: Frequent 
 
By reducing or eliminating the risk and underlying hazard, the inherent safety of 
the process can be increased. Further, by eliminating or reducing the likelihood of the 
cause, prevention has been implemented. By relocating sources, adding new mitigation 
systems, including inherently safer designs to the process, and improving effectiveness of 
existing mitigation safeguards, the severity of consequences, through mitigation, has also 
reduced the scenario risk. By adding layers of protection and improving existing 
safeguards’ the availability and reliability, risk reduction can be achieved. 
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F. METHODS OF RISK ANALYSIS 
1. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
PHAs are required to be conducted by high-risk chemical facilities that fall under 
the regulatory oversight of OSHA’s PSM program and EPA’s RMP program.96 The 
governing Code of Federal Regulation explains that this PHA 
shall be appropriate to the complexity of the process and shall identify, 
evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. Employers shall 
determine and document the priority order for conducting process hazard 
analyses based on a rationale which includes such considerations as extent 
of the process hazards, number of potentially affected employees, age of 
the process, and operating history of the process.97 
The initial PHA must address:  
• Equipment in the process 
• Hazards of the process 
• Identification of previous incidents 
• Engineering and administrative controls 
• Consequences of failures 
• Facility siting 
• Human factors 
• Qualitative evaluation of safety and health effects 
• Consequences of deviation 
• Steps required to correct or avoid deviation98 
A thorough PHA study can not only avert risks and identify opportunities to 
prioritize safeguards through risk-ranking techniques, but can also save the organization 
money. This is where emergency management professional need to closely evaluate and 
                                                 
96 29 CFR § 1910.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid. 
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review if a facility’s PHA has adequately identified their risks and has implemented 
necessary risk reduction safeguards. 
The hazard analysis should be evaluated against procedural-based operations such 
as process startups, loading/unloading of hazardous materials, modification of operating 
states, and computer programmable logic controllers. The concept of a PHA is to identify 
problems, not to solve them. Solutions are then developed outside of the PHA. The 
following sections present PHA methodologies discussed in this thesis: HAZOP and 
What-If Analysis. There are other PHA methodologies (such as the Fault Tree Analysis, 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, Cause-Consequence Analysis 
and Bow Tie Analysis) but for discussion purposes, the HAZOP and What-If Analysis 
relate better to the case studies conducted in this thesis. 
2. Hazard Operability (HAZOP) 
The HAZOP study seeks to identify and evaluate safety hazards at a high-risk 
chemical facility and is the most commonly used method for PHA study. It is also 
designed to identify operability issues that could threaten the safety of the operations, 
employees, and community. The objective of the HAZOP study is to analyze deviations 
from the design or operational intent that could lead to unintended consequences, such as 
a release or catastrophic failure (problems that occur at specific points during the process 
are referred to as nodes).99 Existing safeguards protecting the process are also evaluated 
for potential causes and consequences associated with any process/procedure deviations. 
When there is a determination that an inadequate safeguards exist for a credible 
deviation, recommendations and actions are suggested to reduce the risk. The HAZOP 
concept is designed to see how well the system operates under design specifications and 
conditions. Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur. This is seen by 
utilizing guided words that stimulate the brainstorming by team leaders, and subject-
matter experts apply the parameters such as flow, temperature, time, volume, and voltage 
to the process. To achieve an effective study, it is essential to consider the process 
deviations as well as abnormal situations within the design scope and abnormal 
                                                 
99 CCPS, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 115. 
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operations. A HAZOP study is beneficial because it is a more rigorous and creative 
approach to identifying potential problems. 
HAZOP studies utilize guide words to standardize results. These words are shown 
in Figure 4.  
Figure 4.  HAZOP Guide Words 
Guide Word Process Parameter 
None Flow 
More of or Less of Presser 
Part of Temperature 
As well as Composition 
Reverse Phase 











Adapted from Geoff Wells, Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (Rugby, U.K.: 
Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1996), 93–95. 
Using a guide word with a parameter creates a study node that deviates from the 
original process condition, which then causes an equipment failure or human error. 
Subsequently, a consequence without safeguards, such as a fire, explosion, or a toxic 
release, impacts the production, employees, and the community. Once the cause of 
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deviation from the study nodes is identified, safeguards—whether engineered or 
administratively designed—are created as an action.  
In the HAZOP study, the deviation must be realistic and sufficient enough to 
credibly occur. Three basic deviations often include human error, equipment failure, and 
external events. For example, a human error can be an operator mistakenly turning the 
wrong valve, creating a hazard that results in a release of hazardous material from a 
process.100 Equipment failure often includes a mechanical operating failure resulting in 
the release of a hazardous material, causing an impact loss. External events, such as an 
earthquake, flood, power failure, or fire are events that affect the operation of the unit 
resulting in the release of hazardous materials.101 External events can also be events 
attributed to sabotage.102 Table 3 presents a shortened list of guide words used in a risk 
assessment within the operating parameters and paired with deviations outside the normal 
process parameters.103  
Table 3.   Guide Words for Deviation 
Guide Word Parameter Deviation 
No Flow No flow 
More Pressure High pressure 
Less Temperature Low temperature 
As well as Addition Extra steps performed, extra chemicals added 
 
 
The principle of a HAZOP study aims to identify and compare the normal design 
and operations from the deviated nodes. The HAZOP starts with the study node and 
proceeds to each process, reviewing the design and intention. A guide word is selected 
along with a parameter and meaningful deviation. A list of causes, consequences, and 
                                                 
100 CCPS, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, xxiv. 
101 Ibid., xxiii. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Reich and Dear, Process Safety Management Guidelines. 
 53 
safeguards are identified. An evaluation need is completed based on the risk identified in 
the risk matrix. The study nodes identified as “very high” would then have immediate 
recommendations for action, and so on with the rest of the risk categories based on the 
risk matrix. Other considerations required by OSHA and EPA include consequence 
studies to include the qualitative range of potential impacts.104 Causes, consequences, 
and safeguards that involve human error are to be included. In addition, causes and 
safeguards that are influenced by plant siting should be described and included as a study 
node. The study is complete when every component of the hazard based on the process 
and instrumentation diagram, as well as the block flow diagram of the entire covered 
process, has been studied against all the guide words and nodes.  
The HAZOP is also able to help determine a risk ranking should multiple hazards 
be discovered. Evaluating safeguards helps the study determine what combination of 
cause and consequences present a credible process hazard based on the risk reduction of 
severity. It is essential for the emergency management professional to review the 
mitigative and preventative safeguards, warnings/alarms that warn of deviations, relief 
systems, and ventilation systems to ensure, again, if practical safeguards have reduced 
risks and have been adequately addressed. 
3. What-If Analysis 
The What-If Analysis is another PHA technique with a specific approach to 
identifying hazards, initiating events, or a sequence of events that could produce 
unwanted consequences. Possible abnormal operations, causes, consequences, and 
existing safeguards are reviewed and evaluated using the guided questions that start with, 
“what if?” The purpose of a What-If Analysis study is to conduct a thorough, systematic 
examination of the process by formulating questions that suggest an initiating event and a 
failure.105 An example of a “what-if” question would be: What if the raw material is 
added in the wrong concentration? A hypothetical process response would be: If the 
concentration of the raw material were not added correctly as procedures indicate, the 
                                                 
104 29 CFR § 1910, Sec. 119, Appendix C. 
105 “Safety & Health Management Systems eTool,” OSHA. 
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reaction cannot be controlled and a rapid exothermic reaction would result. The 
recommendation would be to establish a raw material written policy and procedure. 
Training would be recommended to ensure employees understand the adverse 
consequence should the wrong concentration of material be added. 
4. Layers of Protection 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quantitative risk analysis tool that 
is used to assist with any PHA to determine the risk of individual hazard scenarios by 
order of magnitude.106 Initiating cause, frequency, severity of consequence, and the 
likelihood of a failure can all be utilized as independent protection layers (IPLs).107 An 
individual review regarding the effectiveness of the safeguards must be analyzed to show 
that the mechanism can operate independently and be considered an inherently safer 
design. IPLs are often depicted as layers of an onion.108 The core of the onion, as 
depicted in Figure 5, consists of the basic integrity design and process. Basic process 
control systems (BPCS) used during normal conditions allow for process levels to be 
relayed back to the operator. Under abnormal conditions, the BPCS signals from the 
process to alert the operator that out-of-normal conditions have been identified, which 
may then trigger mechanical or automated action. Critical alarms and operator 
intervention is engineered into the process design so that, in the event of a critical 
situation under abnormal conditions, actions completed by the design or operator must be 
addressed. Safety instrument functions (otherwise known as a safety instrument system) 
as the implemented IPL. As a separate layer of protection, an example of the physical 
protection would be a pressure relief valve. Release protection would be a physical 
protection, such as a containment wall or blast wall. The outer layers of the onion 
correspond to the prevention and risk communication that is needed on top of physical 
and mechanical protection from a release. 
                                                 
106 CCPS, Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Risk Assessment (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010). 
107 CCPS, Layer of Protection Analysis. 
108 Arther M. Dowell III and Tom R. William, “Layers of Protection Analysis: Generating Scenarios 
Automatically from HAZOP Data,” Process Safety Progress 24, no. 1 (March 2005): 38–44. 
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Figure 5.  LOPA Onion 
 
Source: Health Safety Environment and Quality Engineering Knowledge Book, accessed 
October 2, 2015, http://tetrasafe.com/what-is-layers-of-protection-analysis-lopa-a-
simplified-process-risk-assesment/. 
Each layer of the LOPA onion operates independently from one another in terms 
of operation. Sufficiently designed IPLs are engineered so that the failure of one IPL does 
not negatively affect the potential or cascading effect causing or resulting in the failure of 
another IPL.109 Each IPL is designed to prevent the hazardous event. An IPL can also be 
used as a resource to mitigate the consequences of the event. Further, IPLs are designed 
to perform their safety functions in all conditions, including deviations. As part of a 
                                                 
109 Dowell and William, “Layers of Protection Analysis.” 
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hazard assessment, safeguards that meet specific criteria are identified as IPLs. The 
purpose of a LOPA study is to help answer several questions, such as:  
• How safe is safe enough? 
• How many layers of protection are needed? 
• How much risk reduction should each layer be able to provide? 
By analyzing selected scenarios in detail, specifically from a HAZOP study, 
effective application of LOPA can help determine if the risk analyzed has been reduced 
to an acceptable risk range. LOPAs can further identify existing operations and practices 
thought to have sufficient safeguards, but upon evaluation, the safeguards are found to 
insufficiently reduce risk.  
A LOPA provides quantified risk assessment and is based on the concept of 
protective layers. In order to prevent the occurrence of an undesired consequence, a layer 
of safeguard must be implemented. If the IPL provides the end to the event or hazard, 
then no additional layers of protection are needed. However, there is no such thing as 
perfect protection, so several IPLs are needed to reduce the risk to a tolerable level. Each 
IPL, ideally, should reduce the frequency of the event. A LOPA study is not to be used in 
place of a formal PHA. It should merely be additional assistance to ensure the safeguards 
put in place are adequate as identified in the hazard assessment. Currently, LOPA is not 
required as an assessment by OSHA or the EPA, but should be an integral part of a 
chemical facility’s thorough risk assessment. 
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V. CASE STUDY: WEST FERTILIZER PLANT 
On April 17, 2013, a massive fire and explosion at the West Fertilizer Company 
plant rocked the little town of West, Texas, killing 15 people and wounding 226.110 West 
has a population of nearly 3,000 and is located in the north-central part of the state, 
approximately 70 miles south of Dallas-Fort Worth and 120 miles north of Austin.111 
During the incident, “the intense explosion in the wooden warehouse detonated nearly 30 
tons of ammonium nitrate, destroyed three nearby schools, a nursing home, and thirty-
seven city blocks.”112 The image in Figure 6 shows the impact blast. This case study 
highlights three major failures that led to the catastrophic incident: regulation failures, 
lack of a safety culture, and the community’s failure to understand risk. 
Figure 6.  Impact Blast of the West Fertilizer Company Plant 
 
Image courtesy of Tony Gutierrez, accessed September 18, 2015, www.dispatch.com/
content/graphics/2013/04/texas-explosion/texas-419-01-620.jpg.  
                                                 
110 Eliott C. McLaughlin, “West, Texas, Fertilizer Plant Blast that Killed 15 ‘Preventable,’ Safety 
Board Says,” CNN, April 22, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/22/us/west-texas-fertilizer-plant-
explosion-investigation.  
111 Wikipedia, s.v. “West, Texas,” last modified November 20, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
West,_Texas. 
112 “Preliminary Findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board from its Investigation of the West 
Fertilizer Explosion and Fire,” CSB, June 27, 2013, http://www.csb.gov/documents/?SID=102. 
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Amid ongoing investigation, CSB Chairman Rafael Moure-Eraso stated in a news 
conference that the accident should never had occurred, citing the company’s failure to 
prevent the explosion and subsequent deaths. Moure-Eraso further holds the federal, 
state, and local regulatory agencies accountable for not identifying the serious hazard that 
led to this incident.113 The facility was storing nearly 60 tons of ammonium nitrate 
fertilizer, 30 tons of which were stored in combustible wooden bins inside a wooden 
building.114 Large pressurized vessels of anhydrous ammonia were stored along the 
outside of that same building. Ammonium nitrate, a common agricultural fertilizer in prill 
form, is an oxidizer that, under confinement and high temperatures, will react violently if 
not managed and stored properly.115 While the hazardous material will not burn by itself, 
ammonium nitrate supports and accelerates the combustion of other materials. This 
oxidizing hazardous material is also noted to be shock sensitive when mixed with organic 
materials, which adds to the hazard and challenge of fighting an ammonium nitrate fire as 
seen historically in other incidents as described later. 
A. THE INCIDENT 
At approximately 7:29 p.m. on the night of April 17, 2013, firefighters responded 
to a report of a fire at the West Fertilizer Company plant. At approximately 7:53 p.m., the 
911 dispatch center received a report of an explosion; the caller indicated there were 
many victims. Shortly after the explosion, reports indicated people were trapped inside 
the nearby West Rest Haven nursing home. More than 100 residents of the nursing home 
had to be evacuated.116 Approximately one mile from the West Fertilizer plant, at a local 
convenience store, the explosion could be seen, as depicted in Figure 7.  
 
                                                 
113 “Final Statements from CSB’s April 22 News Conference in Dallas, TX,” CSB, April 22, 2014, 
http://www.csb.gov/documents/?SID=102. 
114 “Preliminary Findings,” CSB. 
115 “Ammonium Nitrate,” CDC, last modified July 1, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcsneng/ 
neng0216.html. 
116 Holly K. Hacker, “Timeline: Fire at West Fertilizer Plant,” Dallas Morning News, April 19, 2013, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/databases/20130419-timeline-fire-at-west-fertilizer-plant.ece. 
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Figure 7.  Czech Stop in West, Texas, on April 17, 2013 
 
Source: Holly K. Hacker, “Timeline: Fire at West Fertilizer Plant,” Dallas Morning 
News, April 19, 2013, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/databases/20130419-timeline-
fire-at-west-fertilizer-plant.ece.  
Among the fifteen casualties, twelve were firefighters from five different 
departments responding that night, including volunteers from the West Fire Department, 
Abbott Fire Department, Merkel Fire Department, Dallas Fire Department, and 
Bruceville-Eddy Fire Department.117 Nearby schools were closed for a week following 
the accident due to toxic ammonia fumes. 
B. FAILURE TO REGULATE 
The West Fertilizer Company started their business in 1962.118 The first and only 
OSHA inspection prior to the incident was in 1985, during which the plant was issued a 
                                                 
117 Natalie DiBlasio, “A Look at Those Killed in West, Texas, Explosion,” USA Today, April 25, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/25/hero-firefighters-west-texas/2112525.  
118 Ginger Allen, “I-Team: What Went Wrong at West Fertilizer Plant,” CBS, April 18, 2013, 
http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/04/18/i-team-what-went-wrong-at-west-fertilizer-plant.  
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$30 citation for improper storage of anhydrous ammonia.119 At that time, OSHA also 
cited four serious violations for respiratory protection, but did not levy any additional 
penalties. Of the seven agencies that regulated and permitted the facility, the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), state equivalent to the EPA, investigated 
the facility two weeks after an ammonia smell complaint in 2006.120 TCEQ cited the 
facility for not obtaining a permit for the storage of approximately 100,000 pounds of 
anhydrous ammonia.121 Also in 2006, the EPA fined the facility $2,300 for not 
submitting the required RMP plan in 2004 for the storage of anhydrous ammonia in 
quantities over the threshold.122 There was no mention or citation from either the EPA or 
TCEQ for the company’s failure to conduct a hazard analysis. Furthermore, there was no 
mention of any inspection of the facility’s process safety program. If such an inspection 
had been conducted, many glaring shortcomings would have been uncovered, including 
the facility’s poor management and understanding of hazards and their emergency 
response plan, and lack of coordination with the local fire department and the LEPC. In 
June of 2012, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration fined the facility for $5,350 for violating, yet again, guidelines for 
storage of anhydrous ammonia.123  
After the explosion, it was discovered that DHS did not know that the West 
Fertilizer plant stored hazardous materials above the reportable threshold quantities 
required by regulation. The company failed to report their quantities under the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, which requires chemical facilities to report 
                                                 
119 “Inspection Detail: West Chemical & Fertilizer Co.,” OSHA, accessed June 23, 2015, 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1911015. 
120 OSHA, EPA, DHS, U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Texas 
Department of State Health Services, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and the Texas Feed 
and Fertilizer Control Service; Theodoric Meyer, “What Went Wrong in West, Texas—And Where Were 
the Regulators?,” ProPublica, April 25, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/what-went-wrong-in-west-
texas-and-where-were-the-regulators. 
121 Bryce Covert, “A Year after the Deadly West, Texas Explosion, No New Regulations,” 
ThinkProgress, April 17, 2014, http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/04/17/3428069/west-texas-
explosion-regulations.  
122 “Detailed Facility Report,” EPA, last modified September 2, 2014, http://echo.epa.gov/detailed-
facility-report. 
123 Manny Fernandez and John Schwartz, “Plant Explosion Tears at the Heart of a Texas Town,” New 
York Times, April 18, 2013, www.nytimes.com.  
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their chemical inventories and chemical processes that exceed a certain threshold.124 
Reporting requirements are only effective if the correct agencies and organizations are 
notified. Once those notifications are received and regulated by the appropriate agencies, 
it is then a shared responsibility within the community to develop preparedness plans 
based on the hazard assessments.  
OSHA and the EPA both play essential roles in protecting communities from 
chemical disasters. According to these agencies, however, the West Fertilizer facility did 
not pose a significant risk because it lacked any prior history of an accidental release.125 
While many of their citations were issued for the storage of anhydrous ammonia, none of 
them were related to the storage of ammonium nitrate. Given the severity of this accident, 
however, it is apparent that small facilities like West Fertilizer should still be regulated, 
and must apply inherently safer designs to their process. Further, they should be required 
to have an emergency response plan, and they be held accountable for reducing risk to the 
community, environment, and employees.  
Ultimately, the root cause of this accident was the regulatory agencies’ failure to 
understand the nature of the hazard at West Fertilizer, as well as the need to conduct 
thorough inspections at high-risk chemical facilities, regardless of size. To simply 
conduct bare minimum inspections and enforce only simple documentation failures is 
inadequate. Inspections of the site did not include the necessary review of the facility’s 
program elements to ensure the facility’s owner/operator and employees understood 
process safety. Nor did the inspections from any of the regulatory agencies include a 
review of the process hazard. With no substantial inspections, only citations and 
monetary fines for failure to submit a document, there was no regulatory oversight of a 
facility that stored a significant amount of a highly regulated substance. Had a thorough 
inspection and audit been completed, inherently safer design and safeguards would have 
been evaluated for compliance, identifying a need for the facility to fully implement 
process safety management. Regulatory agencies should have facilities that follow the 
                                                 
124 “Preliminary Findings,” CSB. 
125 Ibid. 
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most current and safest handling practices and storage requirements for any regulated 
material.  
Regulations and laws are created to ensure that businesses operate in a safe 
manner. These documents are also written to protect the employees, community, and 
environment from chemical hazards. In order for regulations to work, however, 
enforcement is essential. State and local governments must regulate chemical facilities 
under federal and state guidelines, and must establish local laws, regulations, or 
ordinances to protect the community from chemical disasters. Regulations and laws 
should also be meaningful and coordinated between all regulatory agencies and industry; 
this allows for less confusion and effective implementation.  
Following the incident, the Dallas Morning News reported that, according to 
federal data, twenty-two percent of facilities that store or process hazardous materials in 
Texas have never been inspected, and ten percent were inspected by contractors and 
insurance companies.126 In total, only thirty-three percent of more than the 1,347 
facilities in Texas have filed an emergency plan with the EPA stating they have not had 
an outside safety inspection.127 This creates huge safety and inventory information-
sharing gaps, especially at the local emergency level. It is a shared responsibility of a 
business and the regulators to ensure the protection of the community from disasters.  
Local fire departments are also required to conduct inspections at facilities for 
pre-fire walk plans, but not all inspections are consistent. Large jurisdictions have the 
ability to train fire personnel and inspectors in hazardous materials and emergency 
response and planning, while smaller departments, such as the West Fire Department, 
may not have that expertise. Not only does Texas not have a statewide fire code, it 
“prohibits smaller rural counties from adopting one….McLennan County had not adopted 
a fire code, although it had the authority to do so because of its proximity to the more 
populous Bell County.”128 As a result, industry standards, codes, and regulations set by 
                                                 
126 Daniel Lathrop, “Many Texas Plants Lack Safety Inspections despite Risks, Data Shows,” Dallas 
Morning News, last modified October 2, 2013, www.dallasnews.com. 
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the National Fire Protection Association or International Code Council for the storage of 
ammonium nitrate were not practiced by the West Fertilizer.129 Facilities that store high-
risk chemicals should be required to have fire suppression systems in place.  
In addition, there are no existing federal, state, or local restrictions that would 
require building ammonium nitrate storage facilities at rational stand-off distances from 
sensitive receptors such as homes, businesses, schools, and hospitals. In many cases, it is 
up to the local jurisdictions to enforce zoning and planning codes. Had the community 
been aware of the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the storage of hazardous 
materials at this facility, sensitive receptors may not have been located in such close 
proximity to the plant. To prevent a similar incident, federal, state, regional, and local 
municipalities must work more closely together to appropriately regulate and inspect 
chemical facilities. 
C. FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 
Under EPCRA sections 311 and 312, often referred to as the Tier II report, 
facilities storing extremely hazardous materials at quantities above the reporting 
threshold must submit safety data sheets and inventory reports annually to the SERC, 
LEPC, and the local fire department.130 Tier II reports must include basic facility 
information, employee contact information for emergencies, and, most importantly, 
information regarding the maximum amount of chemical(s) stored or used at a facility. 
According to TCEQ records, a Tier II report was submitted by West Fertilizer that 
reported 110,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, 270 tons of ammonium nitrate, and 
several other regulated extremely hazardous materials (see Appendix B).131 In 2012, 
West Fertilizer filed an EPCRA Tier II report with the McLennan County LEPC 
reporting the storage of up to 270 tons of ammonium nitrate as well as the storage of 
                                                 
129 Ibid. 
130 Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Forms, 42 USC § 11022; 40 CFR § 370.  
131 Tier Two, Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory, Reporting Period: January 1 to 
December 31, 2012: Adair Grain, Inc., DBA West Fertilizer Co., April 18, 2013, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/690112/adair-grain-inc-2012-tier-2-report-tx-dshs.pdf.  
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anhydrous ammonia.132 However, West Fertilizer failed to provide the local fire 
departments the same Tier II information. Safety data sheets, chemical inventory, and 
storage locations were never provided to the most essential parties that would ultimately 
respond to an emergency at the facility.  
Even though a Tier II report was provided to the McLennan County LEPC and the 
Texas Department of State Health Services, the information was never shared or 
disseminated to those who could develop and implement an emergency response plan. 
The information provided to the LEPC and the Health Services should have been 
provided to the first responders in order for the community to appropriately train and 
prepare for a chemical disaster. In addition to the provided information, no hazard 
assessment was completed regarding the facility’s close proximity to other sensitive 
receptors. The LEPC never provided the information to the local planning or building 
departments that needed to recognize the hazard.  
In 2011, West Fertilizer Company resubmitted their RMP data to the EPA, 
indicating the storage of approximately 110,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia (see 
Appendix C).133 A quick calculation and analysis conducted on RMP*Comp indicates 
that the worst-case release scenario would impact approximately 4.4 miles around the 
plant if one anhydrous ammonia tank were to release its entire contents. Figure 8 outlines 
the hazard zone for the offsite consequence analysis. According to the EPA’s 
Environmental and Compliance History Online data system, the population associated 
with the impact zone is rounded up from 4.4 to a 5-mile radius. Within less than one mile, 
approximately 671 households, 753 housing units, and a 588 square mile population 
density would be affected.134 
 
                                                 
132 “Preliminary Findings,” CSB.  
133 “West Fertilizer Risk Management Plan [Redacted],” EPA, April 8, 2013, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/690113/epa-west-fertilizer-risk-management-plan-
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134 “Detailed Facility Report,” EPA. 
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Figure 8.  Anhydrous Ammonia Worst-Case Scenario OCA 
at West Fertilizer Plant 
 
Calculations were completed in RMP*Comp plume modeling. Adapted from Tier Two 
Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory, Reporting Period: January 1 to 
December 31, 2012, Adair Grain, Inc. DBA West Fertilizer Co., April 18, 2013, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/690112/adair-grain-inc-2012-tier-2-report-
tx-dshs.pdf. 
Had the information in Figure 8 been provided to the LEPC, the community 
development and planning personnel would have flagged the nearby nursing home and 
school as receptors too sensitive to be placed in such close proximity to the plant.  
The West Fertilizer plant also failed to communicate its potential hazards to the 
community and its neighbors. Even after the ammonia complaint in 2006, the plant did 
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not actively educate the community about the hazards of anhydrous ammonia or 
ammonium nitrate. The facility also failed to involve the local fire department in 
adequately recognizing the hazards. Had the community and fire department known 
about the hazards and risks involved with the storage of ammonia products, 
communication of those risks and concerns could have prevented lives lost.  
In all, several failed lines of communication led to the unfortunate event at the 
West Fertilizer plant. Whether it was the failure of communication at the regulatory or 
community levels, all levels of communications failed to protect the safety and lives of 
those affected. The state and local governments play a fundamental role in the 
implementation of EPCRA, and the LEPCs within a community have a responsibility and 
duty to ensure that the lines of effective communication are developed and implemented. 
Fostering those communication lines is essential to community safety. 
D. THE CASCADING FAILURES TO RECOGNIZE HAZARD 
Ammonium nitrate has been used historically by terrorists, both domestically and 
internationally. Timothy McVeigh used 4,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate and diesel 
fuel to attack the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995, killing 168 and injuring 
hundreds.135 The dangers of ammonium nitrate became known as early as 1947, when SS 
Grandcamp and SS High Flyer, cargo ships loading ammonium nitrate exploded, at the 
Port of Texas City, Texas, killing 576 and injuring nearly 3,500.136 The explosion caused 
$100 million of damage, with nearly $17 million compensated to 1,394 victims.137 That 
day, the Texas City Fire Department lost all but one firefighter.138  
                                                 
135 Andrew Seidman, “Homeland Security Plans to Regulate Bomb Fertilizer,” August 2, 2011, Los 
Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/; “Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing,” FBI, 
accessed July 1, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing. 
136 “Fertilizer Explosion Kills 581 in Texas,” History.com, accessed January 14, 2016, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fertilizer-explosion-kills-581-in-texas.  
137 “Fertilizer Explosion,” History.com. 
138 Robert Burke, “The Day Texas City Lost its Fire Department,” Firehouse, May 1, 2007, 
http://www.firehouse.com/article/10505314/the-day-texas-city-lost-its-fire-department. 
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In 2009, the El Dorado Chemical Company located in Bryan, Texas—one of the 
largest ammonium fertilizer plants in Texas—caught fire.139 The chemical fire impacted 
nearly 80,000 residents, 50 of whom required medical attention.140 The same news report 
indicated with an estimate of $1 million damages, the facility rebuilt within the 
community and encased the storage of ammonium nitrate in a concrete dome. In addition, 
the facility recognized the hazard and the risk of the materials and endorsed a process 
safety culture that included training and procedures.141 Lessons learned, including 
recognition of the hazards associated with ammonium nitrate at El Dorado, could have 
been adopted by others in the industry. Yet poor safety culture for the handling and 
storage of ammonium nitrate remains in other communities. Sadly, lessons learned from 
the incident at El Dorado did not improve the storage and handling of the hazardous 
chemicals at the West Fertilizer plant.  
Industries must be held accountable for the safe handling of materials. Facilities 
should consider a hierarchy of controls and implement the use of inherently safer designs. 
By simply storing less of the material, the potential danger decreases. Storing hazardous 
materials in appropriate storage units and in safe conditions is essential. In addition, the 
use of safer blends or formulations can also make ammonium nitrate or other chemicals 
less explosive.  
The CSB’s investigative findings for the incident at West Fertilizer Company are 
still pending. However, their preliminary findings indicate that the West Fertilizer plant 
failed to supply the local first responders with information regarding the hazardous 
materials stored onsite. Although most who lived and worked in West, Texas were 
familiar with the fertilizer plant, neither the first responders nor the community knew the 
real dangers and risks of anhydrous ammonia or ammonium nitrate. Furthermore, the 
community did not know how to appropriately handle a chemical emergency at this 
                                                 
139 “Evacuation Lifted, Fire at Texas Chemical Plant under Control,” Fox News, July 30, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/07/30/evacuation-lifted-fire-at-texas-chemical-plant-under-
control.html.  
140 Andrea Salazar, “Bryan Officials Learned from 2009 Fertilizer Fire,” theeagle.com, April 19, 
2013, http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/bryan-officials-learned-from-fertilizer-fire/article_3a3b5d89-
2989-55b0-a50e-1e6a0abc1712.html.  
141 Salazar, “Bryan Officials.” 
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facility. The company did not provide the LEPC or the West Fire Department with safety 
data sheets of the hazardous materials, as required by EPCRA. In turn, McLennan County 
failed to have an emergency response plan in place to handle such an incident. 
Ultimately, these factors caused the community to be unaware of and unprepared for the 
potential hazard the facility posed to the residents.  
As an emergency management professional, the obligation to understand risk in 
order to protect and prepare a community is essential. West, Texas was clearly unaware 
of the risk the facility posed to the community. An emergency management professional 
should be assisting local planning and zoning departments to ensure that high-risk 
chemical facilities are safely sited far from schools, residences, and critical 
infrastructures. This becomes even more essential with the progression of urban sprawl. 
Figure 9 depicts the close proximity of the sensitive receptors to the fertilizer plant. 
Figure 9.  Impact of Sensitive Receptors Close to the 
West Fertilizer Plant Explosion 
 
Photo courtesy of CBS News. Source: “Texas Fertilizer Plant,” Linkmeister, April 18, 
2013, http://linkmeister.com/wordpress/2013/04/texas-fertilizer-plant.  
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In 2002, CSB recommended that both OSHA and the EPA expand their regulated 
substance standards to reactive and hazardous chemicals such as ammonium nitrate. 
However, in developing the RMP and PSM, neither agency adopted the explosives or 
reactive lists as recommended.142 As a result, ammonium nitrate is not listed as an 
extremely hazardous chemical.  
The West Fertilizer Company reportedly stored 110,000 pounds of anhydrous 
ammonia. This process unit met the federal threshold and regulatory reporting 
requirement of over 10,000 pounds under RMP and PSM. Since the West Fertilizer 
incident, the EPA, OSHA, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
have published Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management of Solid 
Ammonium Nitrate Prills.143 Under the CCA, there is debate about whether or not 
ammonium nitrate falls under the EPA’s general duty clause. The general duty clause 
states: 
The owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, 
handling, or storing such substances [i.e., a chemical in 40 CFR part 68 or 
any other extremely hazardous substance] have a general duty...to identify 
hazards which may result from (such) releases using appropriate hazard 
assessment techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such 
steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the 
consequences of accidental releases which do occur.144  
Ammonium nitrate is not currently listed as a regulated extremely hazardous substance, 
but the evaluation and proposal of additional requirements may change.  
Another root cause attributed to the incident at the West Fertilizer plant can be 
found in the failure to recognize the hazards and risks from multiple factors. Not 
recognizing the necessary safeguards and safety culture led to the business’s failed 
responsibility to operate in a safe manner. Because the community failed to recognize 
those hazards, it lacked the awareness needed to implement and enforce safety laws and 
                                                 
142 “Preliminary Findings,” CSB. 
143 EPA, OSHA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Chemical Advisory: Safe 
Storage, Handling, and Management of Solid Ammonium Nitrate Prills (EPA 5550-F-15-001) 
(Washington, DC: EPA, June 2015). 
144 “The General Duty Clause,” EPA, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/2013-10/documents/gdc-fact.pdf. 
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regulations. The failure to communicate the hazards and risks between regulatory 
agencies and the community led to the failure to prepare for a chemical disaster. 
E. CONSEQUENCES 
Lax regulatory oversight was a major contributor to the West Fertilizer Company 
incident. Sadly, there are many facilities that similarly store ammonium nitrate in large 
quantities, under the same conditions. As a result, there are many communities living 
with the same hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities as West, Texas before the incident.  
EO 13650, signed in November 2013, has resulted in many regulatory discussions 
and changes to coordinate chemical industry safety improvements. Recently, EPA Region 
IX chartered a Standard Operating Guideline for chemical facilities. Ongoing state-
specific annual implementation plans are still being developed and implemented.  
So far, preliminary findings from the state agencies, including the CSB, have 
already shed light on the failures related to the federal, state, and local regulations. At the 
state level, the lack of an adopted fire code allowed the unsafe handling and storage of 
chemicals that resulted in the incident. The Texas State Fire Marshall’s Office and the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives concluded the cause of the fire as 
“undetermined.”145 Communities, in all aspects, must work together and learn from the 
failures to understand the root causes and prevent another tragic disaster like that in West, 
Texas from happening elsewhere. 
                                                 
145 “The State Fire Marshal’s Office and ATF Conclude Scene Investigation at the West Fertilizer 
Plant,” Texas Department of Insurance, last modified October 8, 2015, http://www.tdi.texas.gov/news/ 
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VI. CASE STUDY: CHEVRON RICHMOND REFINERY 
A. THE INCIDENT 
On August 6, 2012, the Chevron Refinery, located in Richmond, California, 
experienced a catastrophic event in their processing facility.146 A process pipe flowing a 
flammable, high-temperature light oil gas through an eight-inch line ruptured, releasing a 
flammable vapor cloud into the facility.147 Two minutes after the vapor cloud formed, at 
6:33 p.m., the process fluid ignited. Eighteen employees safely escaped the vapor cloud 
prior to its ignition, but one Chevron refinery firefighter inside a fire engine was engulfed 
by a fireball. Luckily, the firefighter was able to make his way to safety.148 Subsequently, 
the accident released a large plume of hydrocarbons, particulate, and black acrid smoke 
to the surrounding neighborhoods, as seen in Figure 10. 
Figure 10.  Initial Vapor Cloud (White) and Ignited Cloud (Black Smoke) 
 
Source: CSB, Final Investigation Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and 
Fire (Report No. 2012-03-I-CA) (Washington, DC: CSB, January 2015). 
                                                 
146 CSB, Final Investigation Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire (Report No. 
2012-03-I-CA) (Washington, DC: CSB, January 2015). 
147 CSB, Final Investigation Report. 
148 Ibid. 
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At 6:38 p.m., the accident triggered the Community Warning System Level 3 alert 
and a shelter-in-place advisory activated by the County of Contra Costa.149 Contra Costa 
Health Services Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team, under the unified 
command of the local fire department, issued the alert to the cities of Richmond, San 
Pablo, and North Richmond. Nearly five hours later, the fire was fully extinguished and 
the alert and advisory was rescinded.150 In the aftermath, approximately 15,000 people 
from the surrounding areas sought medical treatments at local hospitals, exhibiting 
respiratory and inhalation symptoms, chest pain, and headaches; “Approximately 20 of 
those were admitted to local hospitals for treatment.”151 
B. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE HAZARD 
This case study highlights several technical, organizational, emergency response, 
safety culture, and regulatory deficiencies that resulted in the catastrophic outcome. In 
all, gaps and disconnects within the community failed to prevent this chemical incident.  
The incident initially started around 3:50 p.m. on August 6. A Chevron operator 
was performing a routine inspection and noticed a puddle of material below the process 
piping. The leak was traced to the crude unit column. The operator then determined that 
the line could not be isolated from the process and concluded that the leak did not 
constitute a need for a shutdown, though it was a concern.152 When discussing options, 
operators and Chevron inspectors noted that the pipe walls had been reported as thinning 
due to sulfidation corrosion several years prior.153 Under the direction of a Chevron 
project management two months prior to the incident; however, data collected indicated 
that the line had sufficient wall thickness to last until 2016. Further discussion among the 
                                                 
149 “Hazardous Materials Incident Notification Policy,” Contra Costa Health Services, last modified 
February 2010, http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/incident_notification_policy.pdf; “Shelter-in-Place,” Contra 
Costa Health Services, accessed March 14, 2015, http://cchealth.org/emergencies/shelter-in-place.php. 
150 CSB, Final Investigation Report. 
151 Ibid. 
152 CSB, Final Investigation Report. 
153 Sulfidation corrosion (also known as sulfidic corrosion) is a result of naturally occurring sulfur 
compounds found in crude oil. In absence of hydrogen, corrosion due to sulfur compounds in the crude is 
thought to occur at temperatures above 500 degrees F. “Sulfidation Corrosion,” Inspectioneering, last 
modified June 26, 2015, https://inspectioneering.com/tag/sulfidation. 
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Chevron operators resulted in a leak repair contractor being called out to patch-clamp the 
process piping. In order to properly assess the leak, the Chevron crew removed the 
insulation surrounding the pipe. Chevron firefighters assembled scaffolding and started 
removing the soaked hydrocarbon insulation. As the insulation was removed, the leaking 
material autoignited when exposed to oxygen. Firefighters knocked down the fire on the 
insulation. Under the direction of the operators, the Chevron fire personnel hit the line 
with water to remove more insulation from the piping. This unknowingly caused further 
damage; liquid and vapor hydrocarbons began to form a heavy vapor flammable cloud. 
This was the moment when the 18 firefighters and operators narrowly escaped, making 
their way through the heavy vapor cloud just prior to ignition. The firefighter inside the 
fire engine was sitting approximately sixty-five feet away from the source when he was 
engulfed in a ball of fire. Dressed in full personnel protective gear, the firefighter ran out 
of the engine to safety.154 Figure 11 shows the ruptured pipe as a result of the damage. 
Figure 11.  Photo of Ruptured Process Line 
 
Source: CSB, Final Investigation Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and 
Fire (Report No. 2012-03-I-CA) (Washington, DC: CSB, January 2015). 
                                                 
154 Final Investigation Report, CSB. 
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C. UNDERSTANDING CHEVRON’S PROCESS HAZARDS 
The Chevron Richmond Refinery’s last-submitted RMP, as identified in Contra 
Costa Health Services inspection, in February 2013, identified the covered processes 
onsite that handle regulatory substances as above the threshold quantity.155 Four 
regulated substances were identified: flammables, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and 
sulfuric acid (containing flammable mixtures). A total of thirty-four process units were 
listed. The following are regulatory reporting thresholds that place the facility into the 
RMP and PSM regulations:  
• Flammables: 10,000 pounds of materials listed in Table 2 of the California 
Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) and federal RMP rules. A total 
of 30 process units at the refinery exceeded the flammable threshold 
quantity.  
• Ammonia: anhydrous ammonia regulatory threshold is 500 pounds for 
CalARP and 10,000 pounds for RMP. Aqueous ammonia thresholds are 
500 pounds for CalARP and 20,000 pounds federal RMP for 
concentrations greater than 20% solution in concentration. A total of 11 
process units containing anhydrous ammonia met the CalARP threshold, 
while only 3 process units met the federal threshold.  
• Hydrogen sulfide: regulatory threshold is 500 pounds for CalARP and 
10,000 pounds for federal RMP. A total of 8 process units met the 
CalARP threshold while none met the federal RMP threshold.  
• Sulfuric acid: the CalARP regulatory threshold for the material is 1,000 
pounds and only one process met the threshold.156 
 
D. OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS DATA 
The plume models presented in this section were created using the RMP*Comp to 
calculate an estimated offsite consequence analysis (OCA). Inventory information 
regarding quantities was collected from the California Environmental Reporting System 
(CERS) for the facility. CERS is a unique database system in which all regulated 
                                                 
155 Contra Costa Health Services, Preliminary Determination: Chevron Products Company Richmond 
Refinery (Martinez, CA: Contra Costa Health Services, August 2014).  
156 Contra Costa Health Services, Preliminary Determination. 
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hazardous materials facilities157 in California are required to submit a Hazardous 
Materials Business Plan, which reports the facility’s hazardous materials inventory, 
emergency response plans, site maps, owner/operator information, and training plans.158 
The reportable quantities as prescribed in California are much lower than those for 
EPCRA reporting. The CERS submissions are reported to the local administrating 
agency, also known as the Certified Unified Program Agency (CUPA). CUPA is the local 
regulatory agency designated by California’s EPA to regulate, implement and enforce 
state-mandated environmental and emergency programs within their jurisdiction.159 The 
business plan submission provides essential site-specific hazardous materials information 
to the local first responders. Additionally, the submitted report satisfies both the state and 
federal Community Right-to-Know Acts. CUPAs are required by the EPA and the state’s 
the EPA to conduct inspections every three years at regulated facilities. However, gaps 
and limitations related to the system for collaborative response and agency oversights do 
exist, and are discussed later in this chapter.  
Using the largest vessel stored onsite for the regulated toxic or flammable 
material, Figures 12 and 13 depict the plume modeling calculation and the estimated 
distance of toxic or flammable endpoints subject to certain assumptions, such as wind 
speed and air temperature. The chemicals depicted in the models are not the actual 
chemical released in this particular case study; however, the plume model clearly shows 
the estimated potential and hazard should those materials be released. It should also be 
noted that the facility’s OCA for each toxic and/or flammable process, and the estimated 
population effected by the toxic end point for both the worst-case and the alternative-case 
scenarios are estimated in the RMP Submittal. Taken from the federal EPA’s 
                                                 
157 Regulated facilities include facilities that store and manage hazardous materials/waste that are over 
the reportable threshold—55 gallons of a liquid, 200 cubic feet of a compressed gas, 500 pounds of a solid, 
radioactive materials (where an emergency plan is required by Federal Law), and any extremely hazardous 
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158 In California, the Hazardous Materials Business Plan is an electronic document with detailed 
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in identifying hazardous materials and their storage locations in the event of an emergency. “Electronic 
Reporting,” CalEPA, last modified September 1, 2015, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/CUPA/EReporting/.  
159 “Electronic Reporting,” CalEPA. 
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Environmental and Compliance History Online data system, the demographic 
surrounding a three-mile radius based upon the 2010 U.S. Census poll is added to the 
information in Figures 12 and 13.160 
Figure 12.  Anhydrous Ammonia Worst-Case Scenario OCA 
 
Calculations were completed in RMP*Comp plume modeling. Quantities were obtained 
by the facilities submission in CERS. 
                                                 
160 “Detailed Facility Report,” EPA. 
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Figure 13.  Isobutane Worst-Case Scenario OCA 
 
Calculations were completed in RMP*Comp plume modeling. Quantities were obtained 
by the facilities submission in CERS. 
It is important to note that the toxic end point extends beyond the flammable end 
point of a release. 
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E. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE HAZARDS AND RISKS 
For decades, the refinery industry has known about sulfidation corrosion in aging 
carbon steel piping. According to CSB findings, nearly “95% of the 144 refineries in the 
United States, including the Chevron Richmond Refinery, were built before 1985.”161 
Piping manufacturers prior to 1985 did not produce carbon steel alloys that met the 
specifications of sulfidation corrosion rates. Only a certain percentage of refineries have 
addressed piping replacements for their processes. In this particular case study, Chevron 
failed to carry out and recognize the necessary inherently-safer-design requirements to 
replace the piping. In 2002, a limited number of individuals from Chevron Energy 
Technology Company, a separate organization that provides technical expertise to 
Chevron, knew and understood sulfidation corrosion and recommended that Chevron 
fully inspect and replace process piping throughout the plant.162 Those recommendations, 
however, were never carried out nor addressed in the PHA. Despite inspections showing 
evidence of corrosion, no formal system of checks and balances was in place to track the 
company’s follow-through with the replacement.  
Surprisingly, a failure in 2010 occurred at the Chevron Richmond Refinery—an 
event that should have prompted further investigation and risk evaluation. A process pipe, 
unrelated to the one that failed in 2012, was found to be leaking high-temperature jet fuel 
in another portion of the refinery.163 Operations “reported the leak to management, 
however, no action was taken to repair the leak or shut down the unit.”164 Unit operators 
expressed concerns over the continuous operations of the unit with the given hazardous 
process leak. The unit was finally shut down for repair, but only after an additional two 
days, during which the leak worsened.165  
Further evaluation of the missed hazards indicate, through a series of events, that 
Chevron lacked management oversight (or action) to effectively deal with replacement 
                                                 






and inspections of the process piping; repairs were denied due to a lack of understanding 
and communication regarding the importance of sulfidation corrosion, or the importance 
of implementing a safer design. The root cause makes it clear that facilities must identify 
mechanical failures and their related vulnerabilities to minimize the potential of process 
failure. Currently, there is no requirement for facilities to conduct a damage mechanism 
review on chemical processes. Ultimately, Chevron’s failure to recognize process hazards 
and the apparent lack of a safety culture led to a cascading catastrophic release that could 
have been prevented. 
F. FAILURE TO REGULATE 
The challenge of regulation is to create effective and meaningful laws that reduce 
risks and make facilities and processes safe. California, among many other states, is 
progressive in health and safety regulations. Inspections and evaluations of process safety 
were not to blame at the Chevron Richmond Refinery. Instead, gaps in regulations 
allowed for the conditions that led to the refinery disaster. As mentioned previously, there 
is no requirement for chemical processes to conduct a damage mechanism review of 
failures within a chemical process that might be caused by process corrosion, heat, 
vibration, and chemical interaction. Had Chevron been required to conduct damage 
mechanism review and to act upon those findings, the review would have indicated 
deficiencies in both industry and inspectors. Chevron had, in previous studies, recognized 
and identified the sulfidation corrosion on piping, but did not act upon those findings due 
to production pressures. This is where regulations should have actionable enforcement 
action. If the review included revealing the consequences should failure occur, as well as 
including the safeguards in place to control those hazards, the need for action would have 
been clear. Regulatory agencies would then have been able to enforce facilities to 
implement corrective actions based upon the findings from the damage mechanism 
review. This review coincides with the mechanical integrity and PHA. Failure to have 
effective enforcement tools and recognize the importance of damage mechanism reviews 
within the PHA is a double-missed opportunity.  
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Current regulations also do not require businesses to analyze and use inherently 
safer technologies. Although inherently safer technologies are known in industry as best 
practice, they are not currently mandated or required by law. The identification of an 
inherently safer design should, in fact, be placed into operation of a system to reduce 
process hazards. By analyzing the existing inherently safer technology, this ensures that 
the failures of others’ controls do not cause the failure of the safety design. The 
inherently safer technology is intended to operate and function separately. Inherently 
safer designs must be evaluated for their effectiveness as safeguards on a process. Had 
Chevron been required to utilize inherently safer technologies and had evaluated their 
safeguards, the piping would have been replaced, preventing the release. A hierarchy of 
controls with safe designs should be used to reduce process hazards. The use of higher 
safe controls to be the most effective should be considered in order to eliminate or 
minimize the hazards associated with the process. Regulations, for the most part, require 
only the completion of a PHA and a hazard analysis; a mandate to reduce risk or to 
continuously operate and evaluate for safety improvements does not exist.  
Currently, RMP and PSM regulations are vague and left open to interpretation 
regarding when deficiencies or identified risks should be corrected. The need to 
implement corrective actions is left to the facility within a “reasonable” timeframe. To be 
effective, regulations must implement timeframes to correct potential failures if they are 
related to the safety or recognized failure of a system based on risk. Recognized failures 
and safety issues cannot stay unaddressed.  
The Chevron Richmond Refinery incident is having a huge impact on regulatory 
changes for refineries in California and the development of the Interagency Refinery 
Task Force, led by the California EPA, to improve both public and worker safety at oil 
refineries.166 Regulations must evolve and provide for an understanding of process safety 
and the recognition of hazards. 
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G. FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
Understandably, though unexpectedly, a large number of residents sought medical 
evaluation after the incident. Because of the densely populated location, air quality 
sampling was essential. The Bay Area Air Quality Management District conducted 
numerous air samples throughout the area both during and after the incident due to the 
community’s concerns. Analytical data results indicated slightly elevated levels of 
elemental carbon, an indication of combustion. Particulate levels were present, but still 
below the allowable state and federal air quality standards. Officials indicated that the 
Chevron incident did not present any health impacts to the residents in the immediate 
area.167 Community environmental justice activists, joined by the citizens of Richmond 
and city council members, filed roughly 10,000 lawsuits against the Chevron Corporation 
for their lack of a safety culture and negligence.168 Chevron announced in January of 
2013 that $10 million in settlement claims had been issued to the 24,000 residents who 
suffered from breathing problems as a result of the fire, including compensation monies 
for area hospitals and local government agencies.169 In August of 2013, Chevron 
Corporation agreed to pay $2 million in fines and restitution for the incident.170 Chevron 
pled no contest to six charges filed by the California Attorney General’s Office and the 
Contra Costa District Attorney. Charges included the failure to “correct deficiencies in 
equipment and failing to require the use of inherently safer designs to protect employees 
from potential harm.”171 In addition, California OSHA issued the Chevron Richmond 
Refinery 25 citations, nearing $1 million.172 OSHA citation documents that the facility 
willfully committed eleven serious violations that led to the incident, including the failure 
to follow recommendations to replace the corroded pipe. Additional citations included 
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twelve other serious violations for failure to follow emergency shutdown procedures and, 
most importantly, failure to implement the required PSM procedure.173  
Thirteen million dollars later and counting, had appropriate risk assessment, 
communication and regulatory measures been taken, this incident could have been 
prevented. Chevron operated outside the margins of safety, placing their employees, the 
community, and the environment at risk. Chevron failed to instill a safety culture, failed 
to properly understand their hazards and associated risks, and endangered many by 
emphasizing production over safety. Chevron failed to ensure the safety and protection of 
their employees and the community. The failures and actions to communicate internally 
resulted in the disaster. Chevron must evaluate their use of inherently safer technologies 
to ensure that the safest and most effective uses of controls are in place to lower or 
eliminate the risks. Chevron must change their safety culture.  
Transparency between the regulated facility, regulators, and members of the 
community must exist. Communication must exist in order to have preparedness within a 
community. Since the incident, Chevron has inspected all piping components within the 
refinery that were susceptible to the sulfidation corrosion. Chevron has also inspected all 
of the piping associated with the crude unit that was potentially subject to sulfidation 
corrosion. Multiple sections throughout the plant consisting of the carbon steel piping 
components have been replaced. In addition, Chevron developed and implemented an 
enhanced mechanical integrity inspection program to identify the replacement of 
components. Damage review mechanisms have also been added as safeguards necessary 
to mitigate risk.174  
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VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
After any accident, it is easy to point blame and address the problem(s) or 
symptoms associated with a particular facility. This, however, does not address the 
underlying structural causes of the problem. As illustrated by the case studies, several 
root causes were identified as precursors to chemical disasters. In both cases, it was a 
combination of a failure to communicate, failure of existing regulations, and failure to 
implement those regulations. Furthermore, the failure by all parties to recognize and 
understand the magnitude of the hazards and risks led to a disconnect between emergency 
management professionals, regulatory agencies, and the local industries. Clearly, the 
community of these stakeholders, as well as the local population, must work together to 
recognize, plan, and prepare for the hazards that reside in their communities. By taking 
key concepts from these case studies, we can provide a framework for communities to 
effectively use the information available to better plan and allocate resources. There are 
two key concepts to this proposed framework: 
 
1. Risk communication must embrace a wide spectrum of risks and address 
risk issues clearly and directly. 
2. With safety foremost in mind, the community stakeholders must 
communicate clearly to prepare, in advance, emergency response and 
mitigation measures.  
 
A. RECOGNIZING THE HAZARDS AND RISKS 
Based on the number of RMP facilities in this nation, it is abundantly clear that 
there are a large number of potentially hazardous chemical facilities embedded in our 
communities. The consequences may vary, but there is a reasonable understanding that 
communities are at risk should a hazardous materials release occur at a facility. By 
balancing the potential severity and likelihood of the risks posed by these facilities, a 
community should plan for the worst-case scenario and the impact of an OCA. The 
failure scenario and potential consequence can be refined after conducting a process 
hazard analysis. This is crucial and depends on the facility conducting a comprehensive 
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hazard analysis that recognizes risks and has fully evaluated and implemented the use of 
inherently safer design to technologies and chemicals. 
By taking the tools and programs in place for individual facilities to evaluate their 
risks, the community as a whole can utilize the same concepts to examine their risks. This 
view allows the community to have a more holistic, systems perspective. By evaluating 
the OCA data and identifying the location of critical infrastructures and key resources 
(CIKR), a community can better assess the severity of a chemical release. The CIKR map 
should identify all the CIKR within a community, such as fire stations, law enforcement 
departments (substations), hospitals, schools, water sources, energy infrastructure assets, 
chemical facilities and their OCAs, communication centers, defense centers, financial 
institutions, food and agricultural suppliers, government facilities, transportation systems, 
and other key essential sectors. Only by so doing can the analyst see the ripple effects 
that could be caused by a chemical release. PPD-21 identifies sixteen critical 
infrastructure sectors and networks that are considered vital to the nation. Should any of 
these infrastructures be compromised by a chemical release, it may well cause cascading 
effects that degrade a community’s security, economy, public health, and general 
safety.175  
The mapping tool would assist local emergency management professionals and 
emergency services in effectively evaluating protective actions for those key resources 
and sensitive receptors. This is done by initially mapping out the OCA toxic/flammable 
distance end point of the regulated high-risk chemical facility and overlaying that plume 
onto the CIKR assets. By identifying the potential worst-case scenario impacts, 
emergency management professionals can utilize this tool, in real-time response, to 
assess what may be potentially impacted.  
The evaluation begins by assessing the first responders’ strategic locations and 
logistical movements to the impacted receptor. Responders must be able to respond 
without also being personally affected. Adequate protective resources must be provided 
to the first responders for the likely range of potential hazards. This will only be possible 
                                                 
175 The White House, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21) (Washington, DC: The 
White House, February 2013). 
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if the first responders partner with the facility and train together. They absolutely must 
understand the hazards and their associated risks in order to protect the community.  
By evaluating the facility risk profile in its entirety, the worst-case scenario is 
identified as the most consequential to the community should mitigations and safeguards 
fail. Keep in mind that this could potentially result in mass causalities and injuries that 
overwhelm the first responders. If such a scenario is possible, steps must be taken to 
either bolster the first responder force or decrease the potential magnitude of a release.  
Because most chemical facilities have been operating in communities for some 
time, it may be economically prohibitive to move a facility away from sensitive receptors 
or to relocate the receptors. However, if the risk is high and the values of frequency/
likelihood remain high despite safeguards, re-location should be considered. Again, the 
evaluation of tolerable risk comes into consideration. Land use and zoning requirements 
must keep sensitive receptors far from the toxic end points identified in the offsite 
consequence analysis. For example, Figure 14 shows a hypothetical city with its CIKR 
and OCA mapped out. Such a map allows a community to determine safe routes of 
evacuation, locations to implement sheltering in place, and key protection zones. In all, a 
community that is aware of its hazards and risks can better prepare and plan for them. 
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Figure 14.  Hypothetical City with High-Risk Chemical Facilities 
 
OCA data and toxic/flammable end points and CIKR are depictured. This figure shows a 
hypothetical town with high-risk facilities and locations of CIKR. Adapted from mappery 
at http://www.mappery.com/Whitehouse-City-Map. 
Any new developments, such as homes, hospitals, nursing homes, daycare 
centers, and shopping malls, should be placed on the hazard map so they do not fall 
within the identified plume endpoints. Unfortunately, many chemical facilities already 
exist in close proximity to our neighborhoods and communities. As such, the proposed 
mapping should be used to pre-plan emergency response actions. By requiring chemical 
facilities to utilize inherently safer technologies and designs, the potential end-point 
zones would not change, but the likely severity of the release, as well as the probability of 
release, would be smaller and the hazard would be reduced.  
Businesses that store high-risk chemicals onsite should reduce their risks to the 
greatest extent practicable. They must evaluate the effectiveness of their safeguards and 
consider the liability associated with their hazards. It is also the business’ responsibility 
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to minimize the risks they impose on the community. Safe operations that require 
inherently safer technologies can be implemented to reduce and minimize impact. 
Hierarchy of controls should be used in conjunction with safer designs so that the most 
effective and safest overall process design is used to reduce process hazard. The 
evaluation of effective safeguards put in place must be proven to show the reduction of 
risks within the process. If the facility does not fully implement the recommendations that 
arise from a PHA, they should be held accountable. As a result of the incidents that 
occurred in Richmond, California and West, Texas, regulatory agencies are modernizing 
policies and regulations to update key programs to protect and prepare communities, 
employees, and facilities. It remains to be seen, however, how prescriptive these new 
regulations will be and if the community risk can be reduced. 
B. FIXING REGULATION 
Regulatory agencies should conduct more comprehensive reviews and should 
have a more coordinated regulatory effort to ensure the safety of high-risk chemical 
processes. Effective regulations that propose changes should achieve the highest possible 
level of safety for the community. These changes should ultimately provide resources to 
the community so it can effectively prepare for and respond to chemical emergencies. 
Regulations should avoid conflicting with one another, and should be based on scientific 
studies that are corroborated with evidence. With a coordinated effort, meaningful 
regulation and effective regulatory agencies must strike a delicate balance that assures 
safety at the highest level while simultaneously allowing businesses to be efficient and 
profitable.  
Rulemaking and amendments must ensure that inherently safer technologies and 
designs are assessed and utilized. The effectiveness of safeguards must also be evaluated 
and ensured. Those safeguards at the top of the hierarchy should be utilized in order to 
reduce process hazards. This will result in the reduction of impact and lower risk. Most 
importantly, the hazard assessment and associated recommendations should be addressed 
and resolved within a standard compliance timeframe mandated by the EPA and OSHA.  
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Facilities should be required to conduct a damage mechanism review within a 
PHA. By assessing damage as a result of process chemical reactions, including corrosion, 
pressure, and temperature, industries can more deeply assess and identify plant 
vulnerabilities. As mentioned earlier, although damage mechanism reviews have been 
conducted by industries, they have never been required by regulations. It is time for 
regulations to incorporate damage mechanisms.  
The facility’s emergency response and contingency plan should also be assessed 
for adequacy. Mitigation safeguards should be in place to contain downstream impacts 
should a release occur. Regulations must also ensure that the safety culture and the risks 
associated with the hazards have been adequately addressed and enforced. Regulations 
should always mandate that actual risk reduction shall occur at all processes of such 
degree of hazard. A continuous safety improvement must be always in sight.  
Currently, there is no nationwide mandate—consistent in every state—that 
requires inspections at high-risk chemical facilities. In California, the CUPAs inspect 
CalARP and RMP facilities and other businesses that store and generate hazardous 
materials/waste only every three years. Mandates at these high-risk facilities should be 
more frequent based upon the risk the facility imposes on the community. Furthermore, 
inspectors must be trained to conduct these technical assessments.  
A careful review of the list of regulated substances that fall under EPA and/or 
OSHA programs should be evaluated for completeness. Including ammonium nitrate in 
the list should be considered due to its inherent hazard and risk. Community should be 
required to adopt building codes and fire codes. This is a necessary standard to ensure 
safety for all within a community. Without standards, and without enforcement of 
standards, safety does not exist.  
Chemical inventory reporting between agencies, first responders, and the 
community must be carried out in a more transparent and effective manner. Database 
exchange systems must be in place between agencies so that businesses do not have to 
the same information in multiple databases. Communication of data must be streamlined 
to where the information is most needed, and in a format that can be easily identified. 
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C. WHAT NOW? 
First responders and regulatory agencies must have open dialogue with facilities 
about the dangers of chemicals and potential impacts to the employees, community, and 
the environment. In turn, first responders, regulatory agencies, and facilities have an 
obligation to communicate and engage in effective preplanning for a chemical disaster. 
This can be done at the LEPC level. LEPCs already exist, and contain a framework made 
up of emergency management professionals, regulatory agents, industry, and citizens. 
LEPCs can be used to strengthen community planning and preparedness, while 
addressing risks and vulnerabilities. Plans can be developed and implemented to address 
those identified risks. The LEPCs’ regional plans and local area plan should include:  
• Identification of hazard zones as determined by OCA 
• Identification of critical infrastructures and key resources 
• Facilities and commodities flow studies of routes of hazardous materials 
within a community 
• Emergency response procedures  
• Emergency management personnel to coordinate and collaborate 
• A facility coordinator to implement the plan 
• Emergency notification procedures  
• Methods for determining the occurrence of a chemical release 
• Determination of the area and population affected by potential releases 
• Identification of local emergency resources, such as equipment, facilities, 
and agencies  
• Evacuation plans 
• Shelter-in-place procedures 
• Training programs for emergency responders 
• Methods and schedules for exercising emergency response plans176 
                                                 
176 EPA, How to Better Prepare Your Community for a Chemical Emergency—A Guide for State, 
Tribal and Local Agencies (Washington, DC: EPA, November 2014).  
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By communicating and working together before an incident, clear guidance and 
incident plans will already have been established and exercised by the community. 
Communities at risk should understand and be prepared for the conditions under which 
they should shelter in place, or when and where to evacuate, depending upon the 
situation. It is also essential to identify evacuation routes and dedicated locations for safe 
gatherings, as well as methods of communication for reuniting families. Being prepared 
for a disaster entails understanding the conditions and executing appropriate plans. This 
can be done by involving local planners, emergency responders, LEPCs, SERCs, and 
members of the community, industry, and non-profit organizations. Preparedness starts 
with communications within a community.  
It is easy to say that most emergency response personnel are trained and equipped 
to handle emergencies. But responding to and managing a large-scale chemical 
emergency is a very different scenario. Information is key. The community and 
responders must understand the nature of the hazard and respond appropriately. The 
necessary coordination, training, resources, equipment, and knowledge are essential. 
Mass causality and decontamination procedures and equipment must be available. 
Ambulances must be ready to transport critical patients to hospitals while avoiding the 
potential plume. Emergency medical services must also be prepared to treat and triage in 
place. Hospitals must be ready to accept a large number of critically wounded patients, 
and still be able to handle the normal traffic of victims that arrive in personal vehicles 
without being properly decontaminated. Hospitals must also have sufficient resources to 
treat patients exposed to hazardous chemicals. This need for surge capacity in response 
and treatment to accommodate rare, but devastating, accidents is critical to keeping 
communities safe. 
As part of emergency preparedness, it is essential that a community is aware of 
evacuation routes, orders, notifications, and shelter-in-place procedures. Shelter-in-place 
is an important concept because there are times when evacuation may not be appropriate 
to keep a community safe from chemical exposure. Many counties have a warning system 
in which sirens or alerts are used to communicate the need for a response. In addition, 
reverse 911 call-down systems can be used to alert residents of a chemical release with 
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potential impact to the community. An emergency management professional should 
evaluate what resources and plans are in place or need to be updated, and implement 
those plans for the community.  
There are many communities today that are not prepared and are unaware of how 
to take actions to protect themselves during a chemical emergency. This is in addition to 
unrecognized hazards and the risks posed by the facilities within their communities. First 
responders, industries, community groups, and local governments must establish 
preparedness for such emergencies for the community. For example, Contra Costa 
County in California, where the Chevron Richmond Refinery operates, has an active 
community awareness program called Community Awareness Emergency Response 
(CAER). CAER is a nonprofit organization where public emergency response agencies, 
local government officials, and industries come together to share a common goal. 
According to the CAER website’s business plan, 
The goal of the Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) 
Code of Management Practices is to assure emergency preparedness and 
to foster community right-to-know. It demands a commitment to openness 
and community dialogue. The code has two major components: first, to 
assure that member facilities that manufacture, process, use, distribute or 
store hazardous materials initiate and maintain a community outreach 
program to openly communicate relevant, useful information responsive to 
the public’s questions and concerns about safety, health, and the 
environment; and second, to help protect employees and communities by 
assuring that each facility has an emergency response program to respond 
rapidly an defectively to emergencies.177  
There are numerous CAER programs all over the United States. Enhancing these 
programs and/or establishing them in a community allows for working partnerships to 
prevent, engage, and rebuild after an event.  
By dissolving the many disconnects between hazard and understanding, and 
facility and community, and applying real frameworks to the root cause, communities can 
work together to better prepare for chemical disasters. Communities have a vested 
interest in ensuring that effective communication, awareness, and preparedness are in 
                                                 
177 “Business Plan,” Contra Costa County CAER Group, accessed April 3, 2015, 
http://www.cococaer.org/PDF/CAERBusinessPlan.pdf.  
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place. In order for that to happen, regulatory agencies must work together to amend 
current gaps in regulation and achieve the highest level of safety for the community and 
the environment. Whatever regulations are in place, or proposed, must be enforced. In 
addition, fostering relationships between industry, the community, and regulatory 
agencies is essential in helping communities better understand their risks. Regionally, 
LEPCs within each jurisdiction should be providing information to communities and first 
responders regarding hazards and planning their response to chemical emergencies. The 
evaluation completed by the community should be carefully reviewed, prioritized, and 
carried out following several key principle strategies. 
 
(1) Identify the Risk 
• Identification of facilities and their chemical related risks within the 
community 
• Identification of routes of transportation of chemicals and their risks 
associated to the community 
• Identification of critical infrastructures and key resources (law 
enforcement, fire, water, electricity, emergency medical services, 
hospitals, transportation, civil defense, communications, financial 
institutions, etc.) 
• Identification of sensitive receptors and their locations (schools, hospitals, 
day care centers, nursing homes, prisons, malls, large public gathering 
locations, events, elected state and local officials, etc.) 
• Identification of environmental sensitive receptors (rivers, parks, reserves, 
lakes, beach, wildlife, agricultural areas, etc.) 
• Identification of risks related to natural disasters related to geological, 
hydrological, and meteorological (wildfire, flood, hurricane, tornado, 
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, etc.) 
• Identification of other vulnerabilities such as cyber, health, and terrorism 
• Determination of OCA of chemical releases from facilities 
• Determination of area(s) and population affected by a chemical release 
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(2) Plan and Prepare 
• Identification of routes of evacuation 
• Identification areas for sheltering in place due to associated risks 
• Implementation of emergency response procedures or plans for 
emergencies 
• Implementation of emergency notifications procedures 
• Identification of emergency response capabilities, resources, training, 
equipment 
• Training and coordination for first responders, hospitals, emergency 
medical services, and regulatory agencies to hazardous materials 
emergencies; Evaluation and update to Regional and local Operational and 
Hazardous Materials Area Plans 
 
(3) Coordinate and Communicate 
• Engage in effective communication and coordination between emergency 
responders, facility operators, regulators, and members of the public 
within the community for emergency planning 
• Train and prepare between all levels of first responders and receivers 
• Train, prepare and provide communication to community regarding 
emergency preparedness 
• Transparency with knowledge and information sharing related to chemical 
data, chemical hazards, and plume modeling 
 
By enhancing coordination, collaboration and communication between emergency 
responders, emergency management professionals, regulatory agencies across all levels, 
industry, and communities’ awareness would be more effective, focused, and would 
achieve clear goals and objectives towards preparedness and risk management. Figure 15 
outlines the framework and for the basis of this process. 
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Figure 15.  Proposed Framework 
 
The proposed framework functions to identify the risk, provide risk assessment ideals, 
show the facilitate planning and preparedness process, and suggest steps for coordinating, 
collaborating, and communicating. 
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VIII. DISCUSSION 
As has been repeated throughout this thesis, it is absolutely essential that 
communities be fully aware of the hazards and risks associated with their chemical 
facilities. These facilities introduce the potential for hazardous chemical release that 
could pose a threat to life. Since each community member has a stake in his or her safety, 
it is important to realize that protecting the community is everyone’s responsibility. It is 
crucial that all stakeholders recognize and understand the risks posed by chemical 
facilities, and that they then formulate plans to directly address those risks. Regulatory 
agencies must work together with industry to ensure that chemical facilities are compliant 
with regulations and to enforce compliance. Furthermore, communities should demand 
that chemical facilities are using inherently safer systems to enable the maximum 
possible protection for the community.  
A number of key safety steps should be taken at each chemical facility, including: 
1. A thorough hazard assessment conducted in concert with local emergency 
responders 
2. Assured and documented compliance with regulatory laws 
3. The deployment of inherently safer designs within plant systems 
4. Demonstrated development of an ingrained corporate safety culture that is 
dedicated to ensuring the safety of the employees as well as the 
community and surrounding environment 
An analysis of those goals and recommendations will directly reflect a facility’s ongoing 
commitment to reducing risk. Avoiding any one of these key safety steps should entail 
consequences for the facility. Experience has shown that, on many occasions, the 
corporate response will claim that regulations are hurting competitiveness. A thorough 
risk analysis will reveal the cost of consequences associated with an offsite chemical 
release that, when considered in the context of the corporate risk portfolio will make the 
business’s case for improving safety and process reliability. The language of risk can be 
used to motivate a profit-driven response that nudges the corporation toward inherently 
safer systems and toward embracing each of the steps proposed steps.  
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It is also essential for emergency management professionals to work with the 
community to prepare and promote awareness about their protection from chemical 
hazards and incidents. Emergency management professionals must engage communities, 
first responders, regulatory agencies, and industry to help support transparency and to 
prevent catastrophes and causalities in the event of a chemical emergency. Disasters 
happen, and so will hazardous materials spills; ensuring that there is a plan and practicing 
the plan, however, will greatly diminish the consequences of any accident. Effective 
safeguards will lower risk by reducing the potential size of a release and by better 
managing the consequences of any release. Having effective risk communication is also 
vital to improving community emergency response. The proper decision concerning 
shelter-in-place or evacuation must be prepared by emergency management professionals 
in the community through a knowledge-based understanding of the hazards. 
Communities that understand potential risks are better equipped with the knowledge 
required to protect themselves and their families. 
A. LIMITATIONS 
There are several factors that must be considered in order to implement the 
proposed framework successfully. First, the individuals most directly involved must be 
trained and educated so they have a complete understanding of risk. By understanding the 
concept of risk and processes that bring about the reduction of risk through a facility’s 
PHA and OCA, these individuals will be able to work as competent partners with 
industry, and to make scientifically sound recommendations that would reduce risk. 
Understanding the technical aspects of a chemical process at a facility and validating 
safeguards are in place for risk reduction is even more important. The individual must 
work collaboratively with regulatory officials to ensure compliance of high-risk chemical 
facilities and that information and data sharing is fluid. By not fully understanding the 
process, a major node or a failure may be missed, which could lead to a catastrophic 
event failure.  
Perhaps the more difficult challenge, however, is to ingrain a new safety culture 
within industries and communities. Changing an existing belief system cannot be done 
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overnight. The stewardship and involvement must come directly from management and 
leadership. Core values must be integrated into all aspects of the community. Safety 
culture must be developed and understood by behavior through values, attitudes, goals, 
and success within an organization’s program. Without the support and understanding of 
safety culture at the top, businesses with inherently dangerous processes will continue to 
endanger not only their employees, but also the communities they surround.  
The community must analyze and assemble information into an understandable 
framework that identifies overall chemical risks and communicates effectively both the 
challenges and the solutions. Communities must accurately identify existing risks to 
prepare for the hazards. The framework proposed in this thesis allows one to visually see 
the risks and vulnerabilities and assists the community with the beginnings of a 
preparedness plan.  
Another challenging aspect will be for land-use officials to guarantee that existing 
hazards are considered during zoning and planning of a community. Effective risk 
communication would enable easy understanding and preparedness before a plan is 
implemented, but it must be done in steps that may appear to infringe upon developers’ 
presumed rights. It must be kept in mind that the identification of a hazard could well 
dissuade potential buyers from purchasing, leasing, or renting in a high-hazard area. 
Clearly, communicating risk is the key. 
Larger communities will have emergency management professionals that can 
fully understand risks and be able to apply the framework to ensure their emergency 
preparedness plan is adequately addressing risks and risk reductions for chemical 
facilities. Smaller and more rural communities, however, may not be as well resourced. 
Smaller communities need to coordinate with their LEPCs, or their local emergency 
management professionals can conduct an assessment and identify their chemical risks. 
Preparedness and awareness is perhaps even more important for these smaller 
communities where first responder resources may be limited.  
Another limitation of this framework is that some regulatory laws are insufficient 
or inconsistent, and must be revised to sync with current industry best practices. 
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Regulations related to PSM and RMP must be aligned and focused on ensuring safety 
management. A more comprehensive process hazard analysis must be developed and 
followed through by facilities. Recommendations identified by the facility’s PHA should 
be closely managed and reviewed by regulatory agencies to ensure that safety issues/
improvements are not overlooked. Regulations should require facilities to reduce risks to 
the greatest extent feasible. This includes ensuring the consistent use and review of 
inherently safer designs. Regulations should also require the evaluation of the hierarchy 
of controls to achieve risk reductions in the process.  
The changes that are coming with Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical 
Facility Safety and Security, the realignment of OSHA’s Process Safety Management 
program, and the EPA’s Risk Management Program are expected to promote better 
strategic coordination and preparedness planning for communities. Tools for the 
emergency management professional on plume modeling and assessing risk will also be 
updated. These include the CAMEO software suite and RMP*Comp presented in this 
thesis. The combination of a comprehensive chemical database, the use of mapping tools 
that overlay plume models on the community, and data information management can 
enable the accurate assessment of community risks. In combination, these tools and 
capabilities provide essential guidance and support for an emergency management 
professional to successfully protect his or her community.  
Risk decision making for emergency management professionals should be 
considered precautionary. Chemical facilities are expected to prevent high-consequence 
failures by enacting risk reduction strategies that render acceptably low probabilities for 
high-consequence events. High-risk incidents arise from high likelihood coupled with 
severe consequence. One can either enact practices that reduce likelihood and/or diminish 
consequences—preferably both. Such actions/practices are key factors in the acceptance 
of risk. Understandably, risks associated with natural disasters may be more acceptable 
than risks that are generated by business practices. Furthermore, the public’s perception 
of risk may be different than that of an emergency management professional’s. When 
communities are unaware of the risks or have risks unknowingly imposed upon them, 
anger and distrust follows.  
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Acceptable risk is also related to the degree a community depends upon a 
particular business or industry for jobs. If a community is highly dependent upon a 
particular facility, then the accidental risks related to that particular industry may be seen 
much differently in the eyes of that community. Yet the risk associated with the facility’s 
technology still exists, and methods of lowering that risk must still be in place. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study focused on the three main root causes of failures: identification of 
risks, effective regulation, and communication/collaboration at community level. High-
risk chemical facilities are subject to more stringent regulatory rules because their process 
chemicals are listed and identified as a having significant health and safety impacts. 
Future studies should include and identify those facilities that store and manage 
chemicals with similar health and safety hazards but are not required to be regulated 
under PSM or RMP because the chemical is not listed as a regulated substance. Other 
case studies could be used to help identify processes and chemicals that exhibit an 
inherent danger to the community. Further research could also be conducted utilizing this 
framework and comparing it to an existing community model or framework drawn from 
communities located in close proximity to nuclear power plants. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Most industrial chemical accidents are preventable. By utilizing a risk assessment 
approach, hazards and vulnerabilities can be identified and addressed to decrease the 
probability of an accident. Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, a 
framework for evaluating and understanding the risks associated with chemical facilities 
is necessary for establishing a community’s vulnerability to a chemical release. Second, 
facilities must be required to conduct a thorough hazard assessment that contrasts their 
current practices with inherently safer designs and to implement those designs if they are 
found lacking. This will require collaboration between the facility and the regulatory 
agency to ensure safeguards are implemented. This leads to the third conclusion: 
effective risk reduction ensures that both the likelihood and the consequences associated 
with chemical hazards are reduced. Ultimately, the community must work together to 
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bridge the disconnect with industry and engage, plan, and prepare the community to 
minimize the risk of a chemical disaster. 
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APPENDIX B. WEST FERTILIZER TIER II REPORT 
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APPENDIX C. WEST FERTILIZER RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
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